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PREFACE 
The purpose of this study is to describe the present state of 
Indian agriculture, to analyze the factors retarding its growth and 
development, to examine its importance in the economy of India, to 
analyze the agricultural policies and their implementation during the 
first three Five Year Plans, and to suggest some alternative approaches. 
The above aspects of the economics of Indian agriculture are dis-
cussed in five Chapters. The content of each Chapter is briefly out-
lined in the following paragraphs. 
The achievements during fifteen years of planning are listed in 
the First Chapter, with particular attention given to foodgrain pro-
duction, irrigation and power facilities, trading of agricultural pro7 
ducts, agricultural credit, and agricultural education and research. 
In short, the present conditions of agriculture in India are explained 
in the First Chapter. 
Analysis of factors retarding the growth and development of Indian 
agriculture is the main task of the Second Chapter. Attention will also 
be given to the socio-economic factors which affect the agricultural 
sector. 
The Third Chapter deals with the importance of agriculture in the 
Indian economy which can be expressed by two simple facts: (1) over 65 
per cent of the people in India depend on agriculture; and (2) nearly 
48 per cent of her national income is derived from the agricultural 
sector . Moreover, agriculture provides raw materials for India's five 
major industries, namely, jute, cotton, sugar, oilseeds, and tea. The 
iii 
agricultural sector also provides export goods, as well as employment 
for the majority of the population. 
The Fourth Chapter mainly provides the statistical information on 
investment in the first three Five Year Plans, particularly in the agri-
cultural sector. The allocation and utilization of the investment in 
agriculture is critically assessed. 
The Fifth and final Chapter deals with the implications of the fore-
going study for future policy. 
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CHAPTER I 
PRESENT STATE OF AGRICULTURE IN INDIA 
In a country like India where nearly every three out of four per-
sons depend on agriculture, the overwhelming importance of agriculture 
in the national economy of the country cannot be over-emphasized. Yet, 
in spite of its preponderant importance in India's national economy, 
agriculture is still depressed. Even after 15 to 20 years of planning 
and development programs, agriculture remains underdeveloped. The 
following data show the state of underdevelopment in the agricultural 
sector. 
India's agricultural income and productivity is far behind not 
only that of developed countries but, also of some of the neighbouring 
developing countries. For instance, in Pakistan, the arable land per 
person is 0.26 hectares,1 while the yield per hectare of arable land 
is US $164.02. In Ceylon, the corresponding figures are 0.15 hectares 
and US $416.73. Compared to this, India has 0.35 hectares of arable . 
land per person while the yield per hectare of arable land is only US 
$90.23. In other words, in Pakistan, the arable land per person is 
about three-fourths of that of India but the yield per hectare in 
Pakistan is about 160 per cent greater. Thus, even when India•s agri-
cultural situation is compared with the countries which achieved their 
independence and started development programs with India, we find that 
1one hectare is equal to 2.471 acres. 
1 
2 
India's achievement in the agricultural sector is rather poor. 1 
v.;:-• .:.:-: it is compared with the more advanced countries the situation 
would be considerably more disappointing. Israel, for example, has 
0.17 hectares of arable land per person; the yield is US $562.50 per 
hectare. The corresponding figures for the Netherlands are 0.08 hectares 
and US $1,174.72, and for Japan the figures are 0.06 hectares and US 
$1,055.28. In other words, in Japan, where only 18 per cent of the land 
is arable the yield per hectare of arable land is nearly 11 times greater. 
Although it is true that, to some extent, agricultural productivity 
depends on natural factors, modern technology has reached a point where 
the negativ~ influence of natural factors could be minimized by the use 
of modern techniques. 2 However, one should remember that the countries 
with which we have compared India do not have more favourable natural 
factors. 
Having a predominantly agricultural economy, India is not produc-
ing enough foodgrains to feed her rapidly increasing population. An 
analysis of the data for the Indian Union during the 30 year period 
from 1936-37 to 1965-66 reveals striking trends. During the first 15 
years, food production declined at the rate of 0.68 per cent per annum, 
and both the peak and the trough points showed declining trends of 
0.54 and 0.50 per cent (average per annum) respectively. During the 
er.a of planned development, food production increased at the rate of 
2.75 per cent per annum and for some years there were unprecedented 
1Dagli, Vadilal, Foundation of Indian Agriculture, Vora & Co., 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Bombay-2, 1968, p. v. 
2
·rb·d . 1 • , p. Vl. 
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rates of growth. However, instability was a differntiating character-
istic of this growth. 1 
Serious shortages of vital inputs such as irrigation facilities, 
fertilizers, new and improved implements contribute to the underdevelop-
ment of agriculture. Before the advent of planning, nearly 19 per cent 
of cultivated land was provided with irrigation facilities. If all the 
potential created since then had been utilized, the irrigable area 
would have risen to 27 per cent of the cultivated area at the end of the 
Third Plan but there has been a gap between the creation of potential 
and its actual utilisation. And this gap continued until 1964-65. In 
other words, as far as the protective role of irrigation in Indian agri-
culture is concerned, more than 3/4 of the cultivated land remained 
exposed to the vagaries of rainfall even after 15 to 20 years of plan-
ning and development programs. 
A) Foodgrains and Other Agricultural Products 
Population pressure on cultivated land resources and on the economy 
as a whole, irregular monsoon and insect plague have kept agricultural 
production low and have increased the count~y•s dependence on food 
imports. Historically, famines have been endemic in India, as late as 
1951, the second year of the launching of the First Plan, for example, 
India faced a feed shortage of 2 million tons. Planned agri-
cultural reorganization, assisted by favourable climatic factors, made 
it possible to increase foodgrain production by 11 million tons per 
annum at the end of the First Plan. As a result of this, near seif-
1Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
4 
sufficiency prevailed on the food front. 1 
In view of this favourable development during the First Plan, the 
government and planners believed that the agriculture situation would 
continue to improve. As a result, greater attention was paid to the 
development of other sectors in the successive Plans to the comparative 
neglect of agriculture. However, subsequent developments show that their 
belief was unfounded. Monsoons were irregular, and crop failures became 
common throughout the country. 
During 1957-58, there was a 10 per cent decline in the production 
of foodgrains, mainly as a result of drought ·. in many .. parts of the 
country. In 1958-59, however, food production was quite large---77.3 
million tons or 20 per cent more than in 1957-58. But due to irregular 
weather conditions and lack of emphasis on agriculture, food production 
again fell to 76.7 million tons in 1959-60. However, things soon im-
. proved and again total food production during 1960-61 stood at 81.9 
million tons, (see Table I:1). This Table shows the production b '·ends 
of foodgrair.s during the planning period. 
We can see that the foodgrain production of 81.04 million tons in 
1961-62 showed a reduction over 1960-61. The position was equally bad 
in the second year of the Third Plan. Foodgrain production during 
1962-63 touched the low level of 78.5 million tons. The situation 
improved during the next two years but again deteriorated appreciably 
during the last year of the Third Plan, as shown in Table I:1. 
Two successive years, 1961-62 and 1962-63, of drought made the 
1see Table III:3, Chapter III, which shows the decline in food 
imports between 1951 and 1955. 
\ 
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TABLE I:1 
Production of Foodgrains (in millions of tons) 
Year Production Year Production 
1 2 1 2 
1950-51 50.825 1960-61 81.970 
1951-52 51.996 1961-62 81.037 
1952-53 59.201 1962-63 78.448 
1953-54 69.821 1963-64 80.243 
1954-55 68.034 1964-65 88.393 
1955-56 66.847 1965-66 73.365 
1956-57 69.852 1966-67* 75.137 
1957-58 64.311 1967-68** 95.588 
1958-59 77.321 1968-69 NA 
1959-60 76.672 1969-70*** 99.000 
Source: Kulkarni, V. G. and D. D. Deshpande, Statistical Outline of 
Indian Economy, Vora & Co., Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Bombay-2, 
1968' p. 28. 
Govt. of India, India: A Reference Annual, Publication division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 
1969, pp. 229-230. 
Notes: *Partially revised estimates. 
**Final estimates. 
***These figures are taken from India News, the Information 
Service, Embassy of India, Washington, D. C., Vol.X, August 6, 
1971. 
NA=Not Available. 
\ 
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agricultural scene extremely depressing and many areas faced starvation 
conditions. In comparison to the average annual rate of growth of 6 
per cent expected for agricultural production, the annual growth was 
only about 2 per cent per annum during the Third Plan. The stagnation 
of Indian agriculture became a matter of great concern. 
It is encouraging to note that recently circumstances have improved 
somewhat. The foodgrain production in 1967-68 was 95.6 miilion tons. 
The Green Revolution which the country has witnessed during the last 
2-4 years has created a lot of justified optimism in the country•s 
capacity for achieving the goal of producing 129 million tons of food-
grains by the end of the Fourth Plan. The record production of about 
99 million tons of foodgrains in 1969-70 showed an increase of roughly 
6 per cent over the previous year. This was due to the adoption of the 
new agricultural strategy. It gives hope that a sustained 5 per cent 
annual rate of growth would make the country self-sufficient in food in 
the course of the next few years. 1 The new agricultural strategy has 
been responsible for the recent boost in farm output. Yet, because of 
the unfavourable weather conditions, there is no guarantee that this 
boost will prevail unless continued importance is given to the agri-
cultural sector in the development programs. 
Apart from foodgrain production, agriculture also provides raw 
material needed by the export industries such as cotton, jute and 
1Qureshi, M.A., 11 India•s Green Revolution Marches Ahead, .. 
India News, The Information Service, Embassy of India, Washington, 
D. C., August 6, 1971. 
7 
sugar. 1 As Table I:2 shows the production of raw fibers (cotton, jute 
and mesta) during the year 1950-51, 1960-61 and 1964-65 was 6,184, 10,478 
and 13,076 thousand bales respectively. The production of oilseeds2 
during the same period was 5,158, 6,624 and 8,584 thousand tons. The 
production of plantation crops3 during the years 1950-51, 1960-61 and 
1964-65 was 544.8, 736.6 and 906.2 million kgs. respectively and sugar-
cane production during the same period was 57, 84 and 123 million tons 
(in terms of gur). 
B) Irrigation and Power 
The Central Board of Irrigation and Power, established in 1927, is 
responsible for the initiation of fundamental research in the field of 
irrigation and power. It co-ordinates the work of 21 research stations 
established throughout the country. The Central Water and Power 
Commission (CW & PC) is charged with the responsibility for -initiating, 
co-ordinating and promoting flood control, irrigation, navigation and 
hydropower generation. It is also responsible for thermal power develop-
ment and transmission and utilization of electricity. 
The Technical Committee, constituted by the Planning Commission 
on which the CW & PC has representation, is charged with the utilization 
1Kulkarni, V.G. and D.D.Deshpande, Statistical Outline of Indian 
Economy, Vora & Co., Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Bombay-2, 1968, pp. 224-228. 
20ilseeds include groundnut, eastorseed, sesamum, rape, mustard 
and linseed. 
3Plantation crops include tea, coffee, rubber, potatoes, sugarcane, 
black pepper, chili, ginger, and tobacco. 
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TABLE I :2 
Production Trends of Agricultural Commodities 
(other than foodgrains) 
Commodities Unit· 1950-51 1955-56 1960-61 1964-65 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Raw Fibers: 
Cotton '000 Bales* 2,875 3,998 5,324 5,408 
Jute o: ll II 3,309 4,198 4,014 6,079 
Mesta II II NA 1,153 1,140 1,589 
Totals II II 6,184 9,447 10,478 13,076 
Oil Seeds: 
Groundnut '000 Tons:' 3,481 3,862 4,462 6,176 
Castor Seed II II 103 125 90 101 
Rape & Mustard II II 726 860 1,356 1,375 
Sesamum II II 445 465 321 466 
Lin Seed II II 367 421 395 466 
Totals II II 5,158 5,735 6,624 8,584 
Plantation Crops: 
Tea Million Kg.** 275 285 321 367 
Coffee II II 25 34 43 61 
Rubber II II 14 23 25 46 
Potatoes II II 166 186 275 345 
Black Pepper II II 2 3 3 .:3 
Chili :r II 35 36 37 46 
Ginger II II 2 2 2 2 
Tobacco II II 26 30 31 37 
Totals II II 545 599 737 907 
Sugar Cane Million Tons 57 61 84 123 
Source: Kulkarni, V. G. and D. D. Deshpande, Q£. Cit., pp. 28-32. 
Notes: *One Bale is equal to 396.5 lbs. 
**One Kg. is equal to 2.2026 lbs. 
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and assessment of water resources for major and medium river valley 
schemes and the co-ordination of the data pertaining to minor irrigation 
work for domestic and navigational purposes. The ultimate aim is to 
draw upon the country•s resources and to utilize them fully for increased 
benefits in the country. 
The total water potential of India by way of mean annual river-
flows is estimated at 1,675 billion cu. mters. Of this amount, it i s 
estimated that approximately 555 billion cu. meters could be utilized. 
By 1951, only about 93 billion cu. meters was being used in irrigation 
projects, which is 17 per cent of the estimated useable resources or 
5.6 per cent of the total annual flow. By the end of the Third Plan the 
major, medium and minor projects permitted utilization of nearly 193 cu. 
meters of water, which is approximately 36 per cent of the total useable 
resource. 
As Table 1:3 shows, in 1950-51, the area under irrigation was 
51,523,763 acres. By 1960-61, it increased to 60,870,614 acres and by 
the end of the Third Plan it reached 65,335,711 acres. 1 This was an 
increase of 26.8 per cent during a period of 15 years. The particulars 
of the principal irrigation projects, both those completed up to the end 
of the Third Plan and those which will continue after the Third Plan, .. 
are given in Table 1:4. 
By the end of the Third Plan the Central Board of Irrigation and 
Power had completed 802 projects, of which 13 were completed before 
1These figures include minor, medium and major irrigation. 
2This figure does not include the 10 projects that were completed 
before the Board was established. 
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TABLE I:3 
Progress in Irrigation : Source-wise 
Source 1950-51 1955-56 1960-61 1965-66 
1 2 3 4 5 
in acres 
Govt. Canals 17,687,418 19,829,775 22,617,063 24,282,517 
Pvt. Canals 2,809,523 3,360,560 2,965,200 2,799,643 
Tanks 8,927,723 10,929,233 11,255,405 10,973,711 
Wells 14,771,638 16,653,069 17,998,764 20,867,595 
Other Sources 7,331,457 5,226,165 6,019,356 6,412,245 
Total Net 
Irrigated area 51,527,763 56,235,018 60,870,614 65,335,711 
Gross 
Irrigated area 55,753,173 63,361,382 69,042,211 76,408,262 
Area Irrigated 
more than once 4,225,410 7,126,364 8,171,597 8,601,551 
Source: Agrawal, G. D. and P. C. Bansil, Economic Problems of Indian 
Agriculture, Vikas Publications, Delhi-6, 1969, p. 51. 
Province/State 
1 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam* 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana** 
Keral a 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
My sore 
Orrisa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
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TABLE I :4 
Principal Irrigation Projects 
{Aggregated Under the Head of Province) 
Completed by the End of the Continuing After the 
Third Plan Third Plan 
-Estimated Area Irri- Estimated Ultimate 
Total Cost gated {in Cost {in Benefits {in millions millions millions {mi 11 ions 
of Rs.} of acres} of Rs.) of acres) 
2 3 4 5 
345.13 1,909.6 2,434.9 2,970.9 
39.6 84.2 
306.90 1,493~1 2,238.4 5,804.5 
131.36 190.2 2,687.0 2,646.5 
298.3 1,386.2 
131.35 271.1 354.3 522.3 
44.57 291.9 943.0 1,614.2 
268.64 448.9 2,480.4 2,290.8 
177.16 202.7 2,868.7 2,393.9 
683.73 711.2 474.2 1,791.3 
1,350.11~** 6,454.3*** 291.3 1,840.8 
48.10 73.0 2,103.0 2,077.4 
445.95 861.2 452.0 287.0 
674.61 6,276.2 1,631.9 4,089.4 
12.41 200.0 1,084.6 2,461.0 
Jall1Tlu & Kashmir@ 7.59 22.4 ------- -------
Source: India: A Reference Annual, Op. Cit., 1969, pp. 295-299. 
Notes: *Expenditure was not made before the Third Plan. 
**Haryana .separated from Punjab after the Third Plan. 
***Combined figure for Pujab and Haryana ~ before partition. 
@Investment was not made after the Third Plan. 
This is not an exhaustive list, but it contains selected projects 
whose estimated cost is Rs .8 million or above and, are aggregated 
for different provinces/states rather than for individual projects. 
12 
Planning. Besides this, at present, 69 projects are already in progress. 
Some of them are expected to be completed by the end of 1972, with 
others expected to reach completion by the end of the Fourth Plan. 
Progress in power generation by public utilities was very slow up 
to the mid-twenties. The aggregate installed capacity in 1925 was only 
162,341 kw. By 1945 it had increased more than five-fold to 900,402 kw. 
The installed capacity for power plants in March, 1966 was 9,027,019 kw. 
This was an increase of nearly 392 per cent over 1951. During the same 
period, electricity generation increased from 5,858.4 million kwh. to 
32,990 million kwh., amounting to an increase of about 463 per cent. 
The growth in steam, diesel, and hydro plant capacity during the 
planning period was 302, 116 and 617 per cent respectively. The total 
installed capacity in 1~50 was 2.3 million kw., which increased to 
10.17 million kw. by the end of the Third Plan. The progress of electri-
city supply in India during the period from 1939 to 1967, in terms of 
actual figures for selected years is shown in Table I:5. 
C) Agricultural Credit 
An integrated program of co-operative development was first drawn 
up in the Second Plan. 1 The movement, which at the outset was virtually 
restricted to the provision of credit, was eventually extended to encom-
pass other spheres of economic activity, such as marketing, processing, 
warehousing and storage. In November, 1958, the National Development 
Council resolved that co-operatives should be organized on the basis of 
1Govt. of India, India: A Reference Annual, Publication Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 
1962, especially Chapter 22. 
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TABLE !:5 
Progress of Electricity Supply 
Year Total Instal- Aggregate of Energy Energy 
led Capacity Maximum Demand Genera. ted sold (in 
of Generating in the Year (in billions billions 
Plants (mw) (mw) of kwh.} of kwh.) 
1 2 3 Ll 5 
1939 1.070 576 2.44 203 
1947 1,363 883 7.07 336 
1951 1,835 1,205 5.86 479 
1956 2,886 1,990 9.66 496 
1961 4,653 3,546 16.94 1,395 
1962 5,219 3,971 19.67 1,645 
1963 5,801 4,635 22.36 1,868 
1964 6,576 5,549 26.82 2,179 
1965 7,327 6,257 29.59 2,422 
1966 9,027 7,306 32.99 2,673 
1967 10,190 8,292 36.38 2,913 
Source: India: A Reference Annual, Op. Cit., 1969, p. 285. 
Notes: Column-2 includes electricity generation from Steam , Diesel and 
Hydro Plants. 
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the village community as the primary unit and that responsibility and 
initiative for social and economic development at the village level 
should be placed fully on the village co-operatives and the village 
Panchayats1 with the main aim of providing financial assistance to the 
poor farmers. 
In order to provide financial assistance to the farmers, the 
government of .India revitalized the existing agricultural credit 
societies and land development banks and encouraged the growth of new 
ones in the co-operative sector. Table I:6 shows the average membership, 
share capital, deposits and working capital of agricultural credit 
societies for selected years between 1951-52 and 1966-67. 2 
Grain Banks 
At the end of June, 1966, there were 6,847 Grain Banks in India with 
a membership of 911,000 and a working capital of Rs.59.2 million. Orissa 
State had the highest number of Grain Banks, 814 as of June, 1967. Loans 
advanced by all Grain Banks in the country during 1966-67 amounted to 
Rs.20 million. The main aim of the Grain Banks is to provide financial 
assistance to farmers on credit, with the crop as security. 
Primary Land Development Banks (PLDBs) 
At the end of June, 1967, there were 707 Primary Land Development 
Banks in the country, with a membership of 1,255,000 and a working 
capital of Rs.1,547 million. The main aim of these Banks is to provide 
1Local (village) government. 
2India: A Reference Annual, 1962, Op. Cit., pp. 268-269. 
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TABLE I :6 
Progress in the Agricultural Credit Societies 
During the Planning Period 
Partlcu I ars 1951-52 1961-62 1965-66 
1 2 3 4 
Membership per society 44 91 136 
in Rs . 
Share capital per society 827 3,190 . 6,009 
Share capital per member 19 35 44. 
Deposits per member 9 9 13 
Deposits per society 408 820 1,797 
Working capital per society 4,190 15,126 28,481 
Source: India: A Reference. Annual, 1969, p. 270. 
1966-67 
5 
149 
7.195 
48 
15 
2,187 
34 .980 
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money to the farmers for land development purposes only. Table I:7 
indicates the progress made by Primary Land Development Banks between 
1951-52 and 1966-67. 
Central Land Development Banks (CLDBs)1 
Central Land Development Banks are the pivot of the structure of 
long term finance to agriculturalists. The Central Land Development 
Banks raise their funds mainly by issuing debentures which are guaranteed 
by the State Governments. There were 19 Central Land Development Banks 
in India at the end of June 1967 with a working capital of Rs.2,636 
million. Table I:8 shows the progress made by these Banks between 
1951-52 and 1966-67. 
D) Agricultural Education, Research 
and New Techniques 
There are nine agricultural universities in India. Four more uni-
versities will be set up during the Fourth Plan. These universities 
provide professional training in agriculture. The training and education 
of the farmers are attempted through demonstrations organized by agri-
cultural scientists through the diffusion of agricultural information, 
and the establishment of farmer• discussion groups. 
The Indian Council of Agricultural Research is the central orga-
nization for research in agriculture. In addition, minor agricultural 
research and training programs are also conducted by the co-operative 
farming societies and the community development agencies. 
1The difference between CLDB and PLDB is that the one bank has 
control over the other banks. In other WDrds, CLDBs are at the Central 
level, acting as the Head Office of all other PLBDs which are existing 
in different States. 
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TABLE I :7 
Progress in the Primary Land Development Banks 
During the Planning Period 
Particulars 1951-52 !96!-62 !965-oo I9oo-o7 
1 2 3 4 5 
in millions of Rs. 
Share Capital 5.8 28 . 3 111.8 141.4 
Reserve fund 1.3 3.9 8.8 10.7 
Other fund 0.5 2. 3 6.7 7.9 
Debentures and other 
borrowinJs (including 
deposits 68.4 348.7 1,198.4 1,576.0 
Working c~pital 76.0 383.1 1,369.3 1,735.9 
Loans advanced 13.0 125.9 412.3 408.4 
Loans repaid 4.8 21.9 . 99.9 107.3 
Loans due 69.6 352.8 1,243.3 1,546.7 
Source: India: A Reference Annual, 1969, p. 271. 
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TABLE I:8 
Progress in the Central Land Development Banks 
During the Planning Period 
Particulars 1951-52 1961-62 1965-66 1966-67 
1 2 3 4 5 
Number of Banks 6 17 18 19 
Membership 34,579 299,383 402,934 772,526 
in millions of Rs. 
Share Capital 4.4 57.3 153.·9 189.3 
Reserve Fund 2.5 7.4 15.7 19.2 
Other Funds 1.2 5.6 10.8 16.1 
Debentures 78.3 477.4 1,783.7 2,320.3 
Borrowings 
(including deposits) 15.3 54.6 72.6 90.9 
Working Capital 101.7 617.0 20,065.9 20,635.8 
Sinking Fund 
Investments 12.7 109.2 380.7 494.1 
Investments (including 
cash and bank balances) 7.7 36.2 90.6 120.6 
Loans Advanced 25.1 147.5 564.1 588.5 
Loans Recovered 4.4 39.3 110.0 160.1 
Loans Due 80.5 479.0 1,632.6 2,073.7 
Source: India: A Reference Annual, 1969, p. 271. 
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In the period beginning with the Third Plan, a number of steps have 
been taken for development of new and improved agricultural machinery. 
The Central Government has already set up a Board for Agricultural 
Machinery and Implements. At the State level, special agricultural 
machinery departments have been created to provide proper guidance and 
assistance to the farmers in the use of such machinery. 
The demand for agricultural machinery is increasing very rapidly. 
For example, the demand for tractors is now estimated at over 70,000 
per annum. It is estimated that by 1973-74 the annual demand will be in 
the vicinity of 90,000. In order to meet this requirement, Agro Indus-
tries Corporations have been set up in twelve States. The Fourth Plan 
provides for the establishment of such corporations in the remaining 
States. These corporations supply agricultural machinery and implements 
on a hire-purchase basis and also provide technical and other services 
which necessarily go with such supply. 
E) Present Agricijltural Policy 
This section mainly deals with the present agricultural policy which 
is being implemented in the Fourth Plan. As the Planning Commission 
points out, the Fourth Plan has two main objectives in the agricultural 
sector. They are: 11 (1) to provide the conditions necessary for a susta-
ined increase of about 5 per cent per annum over the next decade; and 
(2) to enable as large a section of the rural population as possible, 
including the small cultivator, the farmer in dry areas and the agri-
cultural labourer, to participate in development and share its benefits. 111 
1
·Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan: 1969-74, Publication 
Branch, Government of India Press, New Delhi, February 1969, p. 120. 
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The development of the agricultural sector is the main task of the 
Fourth Five Year Plan. The Plan recognizes that the pace of development 
in the agricultural sector sets a limit to the growth of industry, of 
exports, and of the economy as a whole. The growth of the economy 
constitutes a major condition for economic and social stability and for 
improving the standard of living and nutrition for the mass of the people. 
The success of the Fourth Plan, therefore, will be judged by the per-
formance in agriculture. 
Targets and Strategy of the Plan 
The specific targets of production determined in the context of the 
over all objectives of agricultural development have to be related to the 
demand likely to be generated by the projected growth of per capita income 
and consumption as well as the expected growth of population. An impor-
tant consideration in determining the targets is the objective of eli-
minating imports of foodgrains as soon as possible. Some selected 
targets for foodgrains and major commercial crops are as follows: (1) 
foodgrain production by 1974 will be 129 million tons per annum; (2) 
oilseeds, 10.5 million tons; (3) sugarcane (in terms of gur), 15 million 
tons; (4) jute, 7.4 million baies; and (5) cotton, 8 million bales. 1 
The strategy of agricultural production places very little emphasis 
on bringing additional land under cultivation. The potentially arable 
area in the country is estimated at about 432.4 million acres. Of this, 
nearly 85 per cent is under cultivation. Thus, there is virtual exhaus-
tion of uncommitted land resources. In the Fourth Plan, it is antici-
1Ibid., pp. 120-121. 
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pated that the net addition to the area will be only about 2.47 million 
acres, which is the target of land reclamation. In this context, the 
strategy of production is primarily dependent on intensive agriculture 
and consists of the following main elements: (1) co-ordinated research 
in respect of all important crops; (2) continued expansion and optimum 
use of irrigation facilities through special programs; (3) raising the 
yield level of commercial crops; (4) expansion in the supply of ferti-
lizers, plant protection material, farm machinery and credit; (5) 
provision for better seeds; and (6) improvement in the agricultural 
marketing system in the interest of the producer with assurance of 
minimum prices. 1 
Financial Outlays 
Table 1:9 shows the public sector and private outlays for the Fourth 
Five Year Plan. Out of an aggregate outlay of Rs.248.82 billion, Rs. 
43.23 billion (17.4 per cent) is allocated for agriculture and allied 
fields,such as community development program. Irrigation and flood 
control receive Rs.10.87 billion (4.4 per cent), allocation for power 
development amounts to Rs.25.23 billion (10.1 per cent}, and Rs.53.38 
billion (21.4 per cent) is allocated for industry and minerals. 2 
It is expected that investment in agriculture will be provided by 
other sources, both institutional and private. On the institutional side, 
it is expected that the operation of land development banks will be 
considerably expanded. A similar expansion is envisaged for the 
1Ibid., p. 122. 
2
· Ibid., p. 123. 
Major Heads of 
Development 
1 
Agriculture and allied fields 
Irrigation and flood control 
Power 
Village and small industries 
Industry and minerals 
Transport and communication 
Education 
Scientific research 
Health 
Farni 1 y p 1 anni ng 
Water supply and sanitation 
TABLE I :9 
Outlay in the Fourth Five Year Plan 
Publ1c Sector 
Outlay % of 
Outlay 
2 3 
Pnvate Sector 
Outlay % of 
Outlay 
4 5 
Publ1c & Pvf.S~2tors 
Tota 1 %. orTota 1 
Outlay Outlay 
6 7 
in billions of Rs. and its percentage in the appropriate sector 
27.28 17.1 16.00 17.8 43.23 17.4 
10.87 6.8 10.87 4.4 
24.48 15.4 0. 75 0.8 25.23 10.1 
2.91 1.8 5.60 6.2 8.53 3.4 
33 .38 21.0 20.00 22.3 53.38 21.4 
32.33 20.3 9.20 10.2 41.57 16.7 
8.23 5.2 0.50 0.6 8.73 3.5 
1.40 0.9 1.40 0.6 
4.35 2.7 4.35 1.7 
3.15 2.0 3.15 1.3 
4.06 2.6 4.06 1.6 
N 
N 
TABLE I:9 (Cont.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Housing, urban and regional development 2.37 1.5 21.75 24.3 24.12 9.7 
Welfare and backward classes 1.42 0.9 1.42 0.6 
Social welfare 0.41 0.3 0.41 0.2 
Labour welfare and craftsmen training 0.40 0.3 0.40 0.2 
Other programs 1. 92 1.2 1.92 0.8 
Inventories 16.00 17.8 16.00 6.4 
Tota 1 s 159.02 100.0 89.80 100.0 248.82 100.0 
Source: Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan: 1969-74, Publication Branch, Government of India 
Pres, New Delhi, 1969, p. 52. 
N 
w 
. ! 
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Agricultural Refinance Corporation and the Agro Industries Corporation. 
In addition, agricultural credit corporations are proposed tc be set up 
in States where co-operative credit agencies are weak. It is expected 
that a new credit guarantee corporation will come into operation to 
facilitate the flow of finances for distribution of fertilizers and 
allied inputs. Commercial banks are expected to cater increasingly to 
the agricultural sector and provide finance both for investment and 
production. As Table I;9 indicates, the private sector is expeeted 
to contribute Rs.16 billion to the agricultural sector in the Fourth 
Five Year Plan. 
\ 
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CHAPTER II 
FACTORS RETARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
It has been indicated in Chapter I that after fifteen to twenty 
years of planning and development programs, agriculture in India is still 
underdeveloped. Now, it is appropriate to examine the factors that 
have retarded the development of agriculture. 
It would be realistic to state that the economic development of a 
country should be so concerned as to take into account its unique social, 
cultural and natural circumstances. A mere imitation of the development 
strategies of other countries is not going to help to solve the serious 
prob.lems the country faces. Because of the undue pre-occupation with 
the industrial development strategies on the model of other countries 
such as the Soviet Union, the Indian Plans have neglected agricultural 
development, which alone can bring about rapid growth of the economy asa 
whole. Consequent slow growth of the economy and retarded conditions in 
agriculture can be primarily attributed to the unrealistic policies of 
the government and the planners. 
A) Nature Dependent Agriculture 
The main problem with Indian agriculture is that it depends very 
heavily on nature, especially on rainfall. That is why it is often said 
that Indian agriculture is a gamble with nature. Consequently, some 
economists and the government argue that the main reason for the failure 
of the agricultural sector in the field of foodgrain production , during 
the Second and Third Plan period, was the climatic conditions. 
25 
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B) Traditional Method of Cultivation 
In this fast-growing technological age, most Indian farmers are still 
attached to the traditional methods of cultivation. They still use the 
same of old wooden or iron plough, bullock-cart and other traditional 
implements. There are a number of reasons for this, for example, lack of 
education, poverty among farmers, and non-availability of new and improved 
implements---the latter being the most important. 1 Moreover, absence of 
double-cropping and the lack of effective crop rotation methods have 
contributed to the low level of agricultural production. 
C) Increasing Population in Agriculture 
The fast-growing population is another problem whic h affects economic 
development, particularly in the agricultural sector. A high rate of 
population growth creates many problems, such as unemployment and food 
shortages. It also affects modernization of farming by creating sub-
division and fragmentation of farms, making the size of farms so small 
that sometimes it is very difficult to employ even the existing crude 
implements fully and economically. 
In the pre-planning period, measures were taken for the protection 
of industrial labour, but little attention was given to the improvement 
of the economic condition of agricultural labour. The phenomena of dis-
guised unemployment, underemployment and surplus population are all 
simultaneously manifested in the daily life of the agricultural community. 
The agricultural labour force receives low wages, suffers from unfavourable 
1For more detail, see Section-G of this Chapter. 
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working conditions and is subject to irregular employment. 
The unemployment existing in Indian agriculture is of two kinds: 
(a) disguised unemplo)ment and (b) seasonal unemployment. A three-month 
field investigation in 1954-55 was conducted by N. A. Mujumdar in nine 
selected villages of the Bombay-Karnatak Region to measure the degree of 
disguised unemployment in agriculture. 1 The author interviewed village 
officers and studied village records to determine the population, land 
use, occupation, number of livestock, labour movements, work schedule, 
and standard cultivated holdings in each village. Also, twenty-five 
families in each village were interviewed to determine family size, 
occupation, source of income, size of holdings, and annual work schedule. 
The author uses the standard cultivated holding as his most important 
unit in estimating underemployment. He defines it as "the area of land 
which is sufficient to absorb, in given conditions of techniques and type 
of farming, the labour of an average farm family working with a pair of 
bullocks."2 Unfortunately, Mujumdar does not tell us what is the standard 
holding. He simply states: 
"When once the standard holding is defined for a village or area, 
the intensity of employment can be measured against the standard 
so determined, the ideal case being that of full employment when 
the cultivated holding is of the size of the standard unit or 
above. All other cases come under disguised unemployment."3 
Mujumdar found, in his nine-village study of small farms, that roughly 
1Mujumdar, N. A., Some Problems of Underdevelopment, Popular Book 
Depot, Bombay, 1961. 
2Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
3Ibid., p. 202. 
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about 71 per cent of the farmers are affected by disguised unemployment. 1 
Thus, this figure, in spite of all the limitations, presents in concrete 
terms the alarming proportions which the phenomena of disguised unemploy-
ment has assumed. 2 
Mujumdar•s definition of disguised unemployment classifies any 
worker on a farm of less than the standard holding as unemployed; he sees 
no need to estimate his productivity in the group. Using the standard 
holding rather than the marginal productivity techniques, Mujumdar 
arrives at the dubious conclusion that more than 70 per cent of the 
agricultural population could be removed from the region without low-
ering production. 
D) Factors Inhibiting Technological Change 
and Mechanization in Indian agriculture 
Technological change and mechanization in agriculture consists of 
adoption of new and improved farming techniques, developed through re-
search, which are calculated to bring about diversification, increase in 
production, and greater economic returns to the farmers. Use of ferti-
lizers, pesticides, improved seeds, machines and implements, and contour 
bunding for conservation of moisture and soil are are examples of such 
change. 
Speedy and extensive introduction of new technology is now recog-
nized as the crucial factor in India's agricultural development. It 
is not yet fully realized, however, that such a change must bring a 
1Ibid., p. 208. 
2Ibjd., p. 208. 
1 
I 
I 
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substantial and assured gain in order to induce the tradition-bound 
farmers, who are accustomed to working with a narrow margin and are not 
prepared to risk these margins for small gain, to accept new technology. 
This means that critical studies on the economic, social, and insti-
tutional implications of technological change are essential in recom-
mending new practices to farmers. Those factors affecting technological 
change and mechanization in Indian agriculture are analyzed here. 
Size of the Farm 
Many economists argue that the main problem of technological 
change and mechanization in Indian agriculture is the size of the farm. 
In other words, where farms are very small, e.g., 0.57 acres, 1 it is 
often impossible to use modern machinery. 
If we look at the facts and figures relating to the size of the farm, 
we find that hearly 310 million acres of land was estimated as being 
owned by rural households in 1954-55.2 This is nearly 38.4 per cent of 
the total geographical area of 61 per cent of the useable topographical 
land,3 owned by approximately 66 million small households (including 
1This example is taken from the author•s own community (village: 
Taraktalav, Dist. Amreli, Gujarat State, India). There are a number of 
other farmers, in and around that community, whose farms range in size 
from one acre to four acres. 
2National Sample Survey (NSS), Report No. 10, p.10. 
3It is estimated that the total geographical area is 806.27 million 
acres (Indian Agricultural Statistics, Vol.I, 1954-55, Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture, New Delhi, 1956, Note I), and total useable topographical 
area, 504.4 million ares (Census of India: 1951, Vol.!, Pt. IA, p. 8). 
The estimated useable geographical area is based on the total estimated 
geographical area of 812.6 million acres, which has since been revised 
as 806.27 acres. 
30 
landless). 1 The redeemir.g factor, however, is that nearly 79.8 per cent 
of rural households are agricultural .2 The average size of ownership 
holdings in the rural areas is only about 4.72 acres. When we look at 
the size distribution of holdings, the farm situation is found to be 
even worse,3 which can be seen in Table II:l. 
Use of Fertilizers and Size of the Farm: The use of modern ferti-
lizers also depends on the size of the farm because if a farmer has a 
large farm, he can then introduce better machines on the farm and 
' . 
provide more water. Thus, he will be able to produce more, will earn 
more money and will be able to buy more fertilizers. A break-down of 
the area fertilized according to the size of farms is given in Table 
11:2. Here it is shown that farmers with larger farms use chemical 
fertilizers more extensively than those having small farms. 
Improved Agricultural Implements and Size of the Farm: The iron 
plough is the only implement which has been accepted by Indian farmers 
on a considerable scale. Here too, farmers with large farms have adopted 
the iron plough to a greater extent. This can be seen from Table II:3. 
Another interesting finding incorporated into Table II:3 is that in 
each size of holding, farmers who use fertilizers also use the iron 
plough to a greater extent than others who do not use fertilizers. A 
1National Sample Survey (NSS), Report 10, p. iv. 
2India: A Reference Annual; Op. Cit., 1954, p. 53. 
3The size of holdings is getting smaller and smaller as time passes 
because of sub-division and fragmentation due to the joint family system 
and other social customs, such as the Law of Inheritance . 
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TABLE II :1 
Distribution of Ownership Households 
According to the Different Size Groups* 
"Size Groups Households Area 
in Mill ions %of Actual %of Average 
of Number Total (in Mil- Total Size 
lions of per 
Acres) Holding 
1 2 3 ll 5 6 
0.00 to 0.009** 14.444 22.0 
0.01 to 0.99 16.346 24.9 4:..275 1.4 0.26 
1.00 to 2.49 9.104 13.9 15.277 4.9 1.68 
2.50 to 4.99 8.975 13.7 32.404 10.5 3.61 
5.00 to 9.99 8.453 12.9 59.550 19.2 7.04 
10.00 to 24.99 6.045 9.2 92.132 29.7 15.24 
25.00 to 49.00 1.735 2.6 59.881 18.7 33.36 
50.00 & above 0.553 0.8 48.331 15.6 87.40 
Totals 65.659 100.0 309.850 100.0 4.72 
Source: John, P. V., Some Aspects of the Structure of India Agricul-
tural Economy, Asia Publication House, New York, 1968, p. 91. 
Notes: *National Sample Survey (NSS), Report No. 10, Cabinet Secre-
tarlate, Government of India, New Delhi, 1958, p. 47. 
**Households, owning no land or less than 0.009 acres are shown 
agaiast this size groups level. 
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TABLE II: 2 
Percentage Area Benefited by Nitrogenous 
and Phosphatic Fertilizers for Various Size-Groups of Holdings 
Oistrict Crop 
r.:r<.:cntae;-; ,\rca llcndi:~ll by 
Nitroco::nou'i fcrtili· 
zers (ac; AiS !Jr 
equivalent) 
Ph,"ph:Hk f.:rtili· 
zcrs (:1s sin$!.: sur··•· 
pho~phatc) 
Less 2-4 A!)o\C Pool- LCS$ :q Ab•)\'C root-
than hec- 4 cd than hcc· 4 cd 
2 tares hcc- (IVCr 2 t:~rcs hcc- over 
hcc· tare-. all hcc- t:~rcs :1!1 
l:~rcs hnld· lares hold-
. . in~;s · in~s 
---------~-----------------------------------------
Th:~nj:t\'Ur 
(1%3·64) 
\\'est Go~l:tvari 
(1963-6-1) 
Shah:tb:td 
(1963·64) 
Raipur 
(1963·64) 
Aligarh 
(1963-~1) 
ludhiana 
(1.963-&1) 
Pali 
(1963-6-1) 
Mandya 
.(1963-64)' 
Surat 
(1962-63) 
Samhalpur 
(191\2-63) 
· Allcppcy 
(I %2-63) 
a•atrhat 
(19(1:!·63} 
llh:tt~ll :\1:\ 
(1%2·(·3) 
<"l,imbatC\TC 
(1%1-62) 
lttrat•;lllki 
(I %2·6~) 
2 
Rice (Kummi) . 
Rice (Sa111f,a) 
Rice (Thaladi) 
Rice (Jst croj)) 
Rice (2nd crop) 
Rice 
Wheat 
Rice · 
~f:lize 
Wheat 
Mni7.c 
Whc:tt 
Maize 
Wheat 
Rice 
Ragl 
Sugarcane 
Rice 
Jowar 
Cotton 
Rice (Autumn) 
Rice (Winter~ 
Rice (Jst crop) 
Rice (2nd crop) 
Rice (3rd crop) 
Rice (1st crop) 
Hicc {2ntl crop) 
Rice 
Rice 
[lice 
Whcot 
... 
3 4 s 6 
53 Sl 65 56 
43 45 62 50 
64 63 74 66 
47 49 59 56 
38 l!7 l!3 . 84 
37 53 (j(j . 59 
23 31 39 34 
9 • 20 31 24 
23 
13 
73 
16 
77 
2 
3 
6 . 
s 
16 
6 
9 
13 
54 
51 
26 
24 33 
34 Gl 
47 . (iQ 
71 80 
20 4 
3 4 
63 74 
7 10 
19 64 
19 14 
4 3 
4 ~ 
J 2 
1 ... 
s 4 
13 IS 
27 JS 
25 33 
29 5-l 
14 22 
so 51 
62 . -16 
33 ~-~ 
27 
42 
59 
81 
8 
4 
70 
. 9 
63 
16 
3 
7 
2 
3 
G 
12 
31 
27 
-II 
IS 
54 
~9 
7 8 
19 33 
37 47 
IS 36 
8 14 
30 46 
16 28 
IS 19 
4 14 
0 
0 
67 
14 
75 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
0 
1 
2 
2 
3 
9 
23 
o· 
2 
59 
6 
72 
10 
1 
0 
1 
1 
9 
II 
20 
0 
1 
s 
9 10 
33 27 . 
61 48 
53 28 
19 . 17 
56 51 
41 34 
29 . 25 
21 . 16 
2 
6 
23 
Sl 
l 
• 
67 
9 
59 
2 
l 
l 
I 
3 
4 
19 
30 
4 
7 
14 
1 
4 
22 
51 
2 
'1 . 
64 " 
8 
62 
4 
1 
1 
l 
3 
s 
9 
23 
2 
s 
9 
Kri,hn:\ 
(1%1-(t:!} Rice 57 ( .. 1 70 ~3 G6 GO 63 6-1 
~tl."crul 
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Source: Panse, V. G. and D. D. Oeshpande, Q.E_: Cit., p. 24. 
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TABLE II :3 
Percentage of Users and Non-Users of Fertilizers 
Having Iron Plough 
District Year Users/ S1ze of Rola1ng ~1n hectares} 
Non-Users/ 0.00 2.00 4.00 Overall 
Overall. to to &. 
1.99 3.99 Above 
1 3 2 4 5 6 6 
Barabanki 1956-57 Users 1 6 31 5 
Non-Users 3 22 2 
Overa 11 11. 6 28 4 
Ferozepur 1957-58 Users 80 80 93 91 
Non-Users 65 77 88 85 
Overall 67 78 89 87 
Meerut 1959-60 Users 22 21 35 27 
Non-Users 3 8 13 7 
Overall 8 14 26 16 
Varansi 1961-62 Users 6 7 17 8 
Non-Users 2 3 19 3 
Overa 11 3 4 18 5 
Coimbtore 1961-62 Users 10 15 22 14 
Non-Users 1 2 10 4 
avera 11 6 8 15 9 
Source: Panse, V. G. and D. D. Deshpande, ~· Cit., p. 130. 
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similar result was found in relation to pumping sets for lift-irrigation 
in the Coimbtore District (Southern India) where such irrigation is 
practised on a considerable scale. See Table II:4. 
Lack of Irrigation 
The use of fertilizers and modern implements in agriculture is also 
dependent upon the availability of an adequate moisture supply in the 
soil, either through ample rainfall or irrigation . . The use .of fertili-
zers is especially closely connected with irrigation facilities. 
Because of this limitation, the use of fertilizers is more widespread 
with crops such as rice and sugarcane, which are grown when there is 
adequate rainfall or sufficient irrigation. According to a research 
project conducted by the Institute of Agricultural Research Statistics, 
New Delhi, in 1962, irrigated wheat responds to fertilizers even more 
profitably than rice; therefore, it is important that farmers growing 
irrigated wheat should be induced to use fertilizers on a much greater 
scale. 1 
This project again pointed out that a possible reason why farmers 
did not use fertilizers was the lack of irrigation facilities. The 
comparison of Group A and Group B, with respect to irrigation facili-
ties and the use of fertilizers, is shown in Table 11:5. This Table 
shows that the average percentage of irrigation facilities in Group A 
is 50.37 per cent and in Group B it is 66.26 per cent. These figures 
are from a sample study and, therefore, it may be possible that this 
1Panse, V. G. and D. Singh,''Promotion and Assessment of Techno-
logical Change in Indian Agriculture,.. Indian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol.XXI, No.1, 1966, p. 4. 
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TABLE II :4 
Percentage of Users and Non-Users of Ferti lizers 
Having Pump Sets 
District Year Users/ Holding-Size {in hectare) 
Non-Users/ 0.00 2.00 4.00 Over-
Overall to to & all 
1.99 3.99 above 
1 2 3 ll 5 6 .:7 
Coimbtore 1961-62 Users 17 38 46 30 
Non-Users 6 11 23 15 
Overa 11 12 24 35 22 
Source: Pnanse V. G. and D. Singh,~- Cit . , p. 130. 
1 
I 
I 
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TABLE II:5 
Irrigation Facilities and the Use of Fertilizers 
Sr. No. Total Area Irrigated % of 
(in Acres) Area Irri-
1 2 
(in Acres} 
3 
gat ion 
4 
GROUP A 
1 95 12 12.63 
2 75 
3 25 14.6 58.40 
J 
4 40 18 45.00 
5 30 26 86.67 
6 27 21 77.78 
7 27 5 18.51 
8 11 9 81.82 
9 8 5.4 67.50 
10 16 10 62 . 50 
11 25 7 28.00 
12 35 18 51.43 
13 8 7 87.50 
14 12 4 33.33 
15 8 8 100.00 
16 11.6 10 86.20 
\ 17 9 9 100.00 
18 6.4 2 31.25 
19 7 1 14.28 I 
20 2 0.2 10.00 ) -
21 7 0.2 5. 00 
Totals 482 1,057.80 
Average 22.95 50 . 37 
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TABLE II:5 (Cont.) 
1 2 3 4 
GROUP B 
1 14 10 71.43 
2 16 16 100.00 
3 35 25.8 73.71 
4 11 11 100.00 
5 30 10 33.33 
6 6 4.6 76.67 
7 54 54 100.00 
8 2.4 2.4 100.00 
9 7 3.2 45.71 
10 10.4 6.0 57.69 
11 5.4 3 55.56 
12 8.2 1 12.19 
13 2 0.8 40.00 
14 7.6 0.8 1033 
15 4.8 4 83.33 
16 2.4 2.4 100.00 
Totals 167.6 1,060.15 
Average 10.47 66.26 
Source: Desai, D. K. and B. M. Sharma,"Technological Cgange and Rate 
Diffusion," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.XXI, 
No.1, 1966, p. 146. 
Notes: The value oft is (-1.54), whi'.:'' . is not significant at 5 per 
cent level of significance. 
The measurement of irrigated area in Column-3, Group-B is in 
Bighas. One Bigha is equal to 0.875 acres. 
I -
I 
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area is more developed and more irrigated than other parts of the country. 
Poverty Among the Farmers 
It is commonly said that the Indian farmer is born in debt, lives in 
debt and dies in debt. Thus, the Indian farmer is very poor and, there-
fore, he cannot afford to employ technology extensively on his farm. 
This simple truth can be seen from the following example from Table 11:6. 
This example is taken from a Master's Thesis by Mr. Tadiboyina 
Venkateswarlu, who has done the case study of Emani Block in Southern 
India. 1 This study maintains that: 
"The questions were asked to elicit reasons for low level of 
fertilizer application, and 81 per cent of families in the 
region expressed dissatisfaction over the adequacy of ferti-
lizer supply. The main reasons for the low amount of ferti-
lizer application were non-availability of adequate supplies 
at the right time, and the lack of purchasing power with the 
farmers, particularly small cultivators."2 .. 
In addition, rapacious and oppressive land-tenure, such as the 
Zamindary system,3 enriched the landlords and increased the misery of 
the tenant farmers. In most cases, less than 1/5 of the net income of 
cultivation was enjoyed by the actual cultivator and the rest went to 
the non-working owner of the land. Thus, absentee landlordism and 
1An intensive field study of one of the 19 villages in Emani Block 
(South India) was carried out in September, 1966 by Mr. Tadiboyina 
Venkateswarlu, a Graduate Student of Economics Department, University 
of Alberta, Alberta, Canada. 
2venkateswarlu, T., Agriculture in Indian Economic Planning, 
Master's Thesis, Oe~artment of Economics, University of Alberta, 
Alberta, Canada, 1967, p. 49. 
3zamindar means Landlord. Zamindary System refers to that type 
of cultivation system in which the Landlord gives his land to the 
farmer for cultivation on a commission basis. 
Obstacles 
1 
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TABLE II :6 
Obstacles in the Use of Fertilizers 
in the Duggirala Region* 
1 to 10 
acres 
2 
Size of the Farm 
10 to 25 
acres 
3 
Above ·'25 
acres 
4 
% 0f total families in the region 
Supply not available 
Could not afford to buy 
Others 21 
11.9 
66.7 
21.4 
25.5 
57.5 
15.0 
66.7 
20.8 
12.5 
Totals 
Source: 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Venkateswarlu, Tadiboyina, Agriculture in Indian -Plannin,, 
Master's Thesis, The University of Alberta, Alberta, 196 , 
p. 49. 
1 
I 
! 
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economic serfdom of tenants were also responsible for backwardness in 
the agricultural sector. Even though various levels of government have 
passed the legislation to abolish the Zamindary System, it has not been 
possible to implement the legislation effectively due to lack of poli-
tical courage on the part of the political executjves. 
Lack of Education 
According to the 1961 Census, 24 per cent of the total population 
was literate. The latest estimate of 1969 places literacy at 34 per 
cent, which is still very low in comparison with the developed countries~ 
However, these figures give a general idea of the extent literacy. When 
it is realized that most of the educated people are not in agriculture, 
the situation in agriculture becomes worse. Official figures are not 
available but it is estimated that hardly 3 to 5 per cent of all farmers 
are educated, i.e. are able to read and write. Thus, most of the 
farmers are uneducated in India, and t herefore, they are unable to 
make use of new technology because it is important to know how to operate 
and use new machines before putting them on the farm. 
C. R. Wharton states that 
11 A key element in the process of agricultural development is the 
human factor----the capacity, ability, and willingness to change 
on the part of millions of small farmers around the world. But 
agricultural development is not exclusively determined by the 
economizing and selling within which they operate. 11 1 
It is generally accepted that literacy is a pre-condition for any t ech-
nological change i n agriculture. 
1wharton, C. R. , 11 Education and Agricultural Growth: The Role of 
of Education in Early State of Agriculture, 11 in C. A. Anderson and M. J. 
Brown's edition, Education and Economic Development, Aldine Press , 
Chicago, 1965, p. 246. 
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Agricultural Labour Force and Mechanization 
From the viewpoint of the agricultural labour force some economists 
argue that mechanization in India agriculture is not practicable on a 
wide scale at the present time because it will create more disguised 
unemployment. At first sight and in the short run this argument may be 
true because it is obvious that, when you employ machinery on the farm, 
the people who are working on that farm will become unemployed. But, 
if we look at it from a long term point of view, this argument is in-
valid because employment opportunities could be created in other fields, 
such as production, repairing, operating and selling of agricultural 
machinery. 
On the other hand, however, with the growing population and l imited 
cultivatable land, it is absolutely necessary to substantially raise 
agricultural productivity. There is no way to increase agricultural 
productivity unless new technology is introduced into agriculture. 
Changes in the technique of agricultural production should be accom-
plished simultaneously with the development of other sectors of the 
economy in order to provide suitable employment opportunities not only 
for the existing unemployed agricultural labourers but also for those 
who may be displaced due to mechanization. 
It is true that mechanization will lead to an increase in the 
volume of unemployment unless there is a major extension of the area 
under agriculture accompanied by rapid development of the industrial 
sector. But, eventually by means of developmental planning, there will 
be a substantial expansion of the non-agricultural sectors of the economy, 
so that new employment opportunities would be provided. However, there 
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is no doubt that, if mechanization in Indian agriculture is introduced, 
there is every likelihood of an increase in the volume of unemployment 
and underemployment in the country----at least initially. Thus, in 
M.A. Qureshi•s words, 11 paradoxically, the new agricultural strategy 
and its unparalleled success in a few years, even as compared to advanced 
countries, has brought in its wake serious socio-economic problems for 
the country. 111 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing study of 11 the technological change and mechani-
zation in Indian agriculture ... five general conclusions appear: 
a. The farmers with larger holdings can more readily adopt new 
technology than the farmers with smaller holdings. 
b. Independent of the size of holdings, farmers who accept one 
improved practice also accept other similar practices more 
readily than the farmers who do not employ any improved practice. 
c. Farmers would like to employ new technology on their farms but 
they cannot afford it and those who can afford new technology 
are often unable to obtain it within a reasonable period of 
time. 
d. Most of the farmers are uneducated and, therefore, they do not 
know how to make use of new technology. 
e. There is a great fear of increas i ng unemployment and disguised 
unemployment, at least in the initial stage of the introduction 
1Qureshi, M.A., 11 India•s Green Revolution Marches Ahead, 11 India 
News, The Information Service, Embassy of India, Washington, D. C., 
August 6, 1971 . 
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of new technology in agriculture. 
Thus, it would not be feasible, :at present, to fully mechanize 
Indian agriculture. But it should be done gradually through the intro-
duction of simple and light machines, the extension of irrigation faci-
lities, the reclamation of wastes and weed-infested land, the application 
of better seeds and an improved variety of manures, and the utilization 
of new techniques of intensive cultivation along with education facili-
ties, adequate financial assistance to the farmers and better admini-
strati on. 
E) Socio-Economic Patterns 
Approximately 75 per cent of the population lives in 600,000 
different villages, with nearly 400,000 of these having a population 
of fewer than 600 people each. 1 A large proportion of this population 
is unconnected by roads and is cut off from the outside world, parti-
cularly in the rainy season. This rural community is highly tradition-
bound by social customs, attitudes and the caste system, which have an 
adverse effect on the economy of India, especially in the agricultural 
sector. 
Social Customs and Attitudes 
There are many social customs and attitudes in India which adversely 
affect the material progress of her economy, for example, the social 
obligation to incur lavish expenditure on marriages and funerals; the 
joint family system, which obliges even moderately prosperous people ·to 
1These figures are based on the 1961 Census of India. 
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share their income with even distant relations;1 and the severe restrtc-
ti o.ns on the activities of and opportunities for women, especially in 
the rural areas. 2 A mere mention of these is sufficient to emphasize 
the point. 
The attitudes toward animals have special importance too. A large 
proportion of the Indian population object to the killing of animals. 
Besides its immediate and direct effects on the food supply, this 
attitude obviously restricts the scope of animal husbandry, severely 
restricts agricultural operations and obstructs progress in agriculture~ 
An extreme example is that of the Jains. 3 The people who belong to the 
Jain religion (or caste) will not knowingly take any form of animal 
life, even that of insects and bacteria. They object to the killing 
of locusts and to the use of chemicals designed to kill the agents or 
carriers of cholera, typhoid, malaria and other fatal deseases. 
The Hindus• ancient religious attachment to the cow is of special 
importance. It has recently found embodiment in statutary measures. 
A Hindu will rarely eat beef or veal, or kill a• cow, and, accordingly, 
will generally resent the killing of any cattle. Legislation has, in 
recent years, been introduced in a number of Indian States, such as 
1The joint family system, by pooling the resources of a group, 
yields important social and economic benefits in a subsistence or near 
subsistence economy. Beyond this stage, however, it generally retards 
economic growth. 
2The restrictions on the opportunities for and activities of women 
in many parts of India are, however, more severe than in other under-
developed countries. 
3Jain is the name of one of the religions in India. 
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Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, prohibiting the killing 
of all kinds of cattle.1 
The Caste System 
There is an enormous number of castes in India. Under the caste 
system, both the social position and the economic activity of the people 
depend on the caste into which they are born. 2 Its operation has, in 
recent years, been declining in extent and intensity, especially in the 
towns and big cities; however, the system is still powerful in rural 
areas, where agriculture is the main occupation of the people. 
Historically, the caste system, in various ways, served important 
and often valuable social and political functions. But, for a long time 
both the system and the attitudes have been very damaging to Indian agri-
culture because it wastes talent, restricts occupational mobility and 
retards the dissemination of new ideas and methods. 
1section 48 of the Indian Constitution lays down as one of the 
directions of policy that the States will take steps for ..... prohibiting 
the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch or draft cattle ... 
2The caste system in India is quite different from the social 
differentiation and hereditary classes found elsewhere, which are, often 
and very impressively, also called castes in popular language. The 
crystallization of differentiated groups into castes, the religious 
sanction of these differentiations, and, above all, untouchability are 
features unique to India. 
CHAPTER III 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE ECONOMY OF INDIA 
The importance of agriculture in the nation•.s life and economy is 
manifested in that it is the main source of income of the people. Agri-
culture is the backbone of India, and the prosperity of her people depends 
on the success and well-being of the farmers. Because nearly 48 per cent 
of India's national income is derived from the agricultural sector, over 
70 per cent of the total population is dependent upon agriculture. 1 
This, to some extent, indicates agriculture's vital role in the economy 
of India. 
In fact, agriculture is not merely an occupation or business pro-
position for the people; it is a tradition which has shaped the country's 
thoughts, outlook and culture. Apart from this, agriculture provides the 
raw materials needed by the important industries. The five largest indu-
stries----textile, jute, sugar, tea and oilseed----depend on agriculture, 
while railways and other transport agencies get the bulk of their business 
from the movement of agricultural produce. Moreover, as will be shown 
later in this Chapter,2 agriculture provides the bulk of India's exports. 
Manufactured goods such as jute, textiles, sugar, oilseeds and tea are 
the most important items in the foreign trade and, hence, account for a 
1shenoy, B. R., Indian Economic Policy, Humanities Press, New York, 
1968, p. vi. 
2see Section-0, 11 Share of Agricultural Commodities in Indian Inter-
national Trade, 11 of this Chapter. 
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amount of India's foreign exchange. 
In a rather broad sense, agricultural progress in India is a pre-
requisite for industrial development. In a dual economy, one of the 
conditions of industrial expansion is the achievement of a high rate of 
agricultural production. Rising agricultural productivity supports and 
sustains industrial development in three important ways. First, it 
permits agriculture to release part of its labour force for industrial 
development while meeting the increasing food needs of the non-agricul-
tural sector. Secondly,it raises agricultural incomes, thereby creating 
the rural purchasing power needed to buy the new industrial goods. The 
rural savings rising from increased income may then be mobilized, by 
direct or indirect means, to finance industrial development. And, 
finally, it enables agriculture to supply the major wage-goods (food) 
of industrial workers at favourable prices. 1 
The most important ways in which increased agricultural output and 
productivity contribute to the over-all economic growth can be summarized 
as follows: (1) In the earlier stages of economic development, expansion 
of exports of agricultural products may be one of the sources of increasing 
income and foreign exchange earnings. (2) Agriculture, as the dominant 
sector of an underdeveloped economy, can contribute to the capital required 
for overhead investment and expansion of secondary industry. (3) The 
rising net cash income of the farm population may be important as a 
1Nicholls, W. H., "The Place of Agriculture in Economic development," 
in Agriculture in Economic Development, edited by C. Eicher and L. Witt, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1964, p. 12. 
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stimulus to industrial expansion. 1 
This importance of agriculture may be further examined with reference 
to the following aspects: A) agriculture's share in the national income; 
B) pattern of livelihood; C) foodgrains; D) share of agricultural 
commodities in international trade; E) interdependence of agriculture 
and industry; and F) agriculture's contribution to capital formation. 
A) Agriculture's Share in the National Income 
As was mentioned earlier, approximately one-half of the national 
income is derived from agriculture and allied activities, employing 
nearly three-fourths of the country's labour force. The national income 
of India for 1964-65 was Rs.200.1 billion as compared to Rs.86.5 billion 
in 1948-49, showing an increase of 132 per cent (at current prices) over 
16 years. (See Table III:l). 
As Table III: 1 indicates, fluctuations in the national income were · 
closely related to fluctuations in agricultural production. For example, 
the net national income of Rs.99 billion in 1951-52 declined in 1952-53 
to Rs.98.2 billion. The reason for this decline was that, during the 
same period, income from the agricultural sector fell from Rs.50.2 billion 
to Rs.48.8 billion. The net national income declined from Rs.104.8 
billion in 1953-54 to Rs.96.1 billion in 1954-55, mainly because there 
was a decline in income from the agricultural sector from Rs.53.1 billion 
to Rs.43.5 billion. As these examples indicate, the economy as a whole 
is closely dependent on the agricultural sector. 
1Johnston, B. F. and J. W. Mellor, "The Role of Agriculture in 
Economic Development," American Economic Review, Vol.51, 1961, pp. 571-72. 
TABLE III: 1 
National Income by Industrial Origin at Current Prices 
Year Agri- Mining & C.T.C. Other Net Net Net 
culture Mfg. etc. Services Domestic Income National 
Products Earned Income at 
a b c d :: at Factor from Factor Cast 
Cost Abroad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
in billions of Rs. 
1948-49 42.5 14.8 16.0 13.4 86.7 -0.2 86.5 
1949-50 44.9 15.0 16.6 13.8 90.3 . ;..Q, 2 90. 1 
~ 
1950-51 48.9 15.3 16.9 14.4 95.5 -0.2 95.3 U) 
First Plan: 
1951-52 50.2 16.8 17.9 15.0 99.9 -0.2 ~ 99,7 
1952-53 48.1 17.0 17.8 15.4 98.3 -0.1 98.2 
1953-54 53.1 17.7 18.0 16.0 104.8 0.0 104.8 
1954-55 43.5 18.0 18 .1 16.5 96.1 0.0 96.1 
1955-56 45.2 18.5 18.8 17.3 99.8 0.0 99.8 
Second Plan: 
1956-57 55.2 20.0 19.6 18.2 113.0 +0.1 113.1 
1957-58 52.8 21.2 20.7 .19.3 114.0 -0.1 113.9 
. ! 
TABLE III: 1 (Cont.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1958-59 62.4 21.7 21.5 20.6 126.2 -0.2 126.0 
1959=60 62.5 23.2 22.3 21.8 129.8 -0.3 129.5 
1960-61* 68.9 26.0 23.4 23.6 141.9 -0.5 141.4 
Third Plan: 
1961-62 69.6 28.8 24.8 25.5 148.7 -0.7 148.0 
1962-63 70.0 30.8 26.5 27.5 154.8 -0.8 154.0 
1963-64 81.7 33.3 28.1 29.9 173.0 -0.9 172.1 
1964-65 102.5 36.0 29.6 32.9 201.2 -1.1 200.1 
Percentage increase or decrease: 
First Plan -7.6 +20.9 +16.9 +20.1 +4.7 
Second Plan +52.4 +40.5 +24.5 +36.4 +41.7 
III Plan** +49.0 +38.5 +26.5 +39.4 +41.5 
ARPA*** · +7.9 +9.8 +5.4 +9.2 +7.8 
Source: Kulkarni, V. G. and D. D. Deshpande, Q£.Cit., pp. 4-5. 
Notes: a. Includes agriculture and aliied field, forestry and fishery. b. Includes mining, factory 
establishment and small enterprises. c. Commerce, Transportation and Communication. 
d,. Includes profession and liberal arts, government services, domestic services and house property. 
*Provisional. **First four years only. 
***Average Rate per Annum, from 1950-51 to 1964-65 only. 
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B) Pattern of Livelihood 
It has become almost axiomatic nowadays that a highly developed 
economy has only a small proportion of its population engaged in agri-
culture. With regard to this Falke Dovring points out that 11 practically 
all the economically less developed countries are predominantly agri-
cultural and all the most highly developed ones have only a small s.e:ctor 
of their population engaged in agriculture or depending upon it for 
their livelihood ... ! 
In India, according to the 1961 Census, out of of a total population 
of 439 million, 298.5 million (68 per cent) depended upon agriculture for 
their livelihood and the remaining 140.5 million (32 per cent) depended 
upon non-agricultural professions. 2 (See Table III:2). 
In India, agriculture is a way of life. 11The people have ··taken to 
agriculture as a routine and it has become the part and parcel of their 
very existence. To a very qreat extent the Indian cultivator labours not 
for profit, not for net return, but for subsistence. 113 There is hardly 
any choice for a cultivator in the area of occupations. As Table III:2 
shows, agriculture as an occupation is the main stay of most of the 
1Dovring, Falke, 11The Share of Agriculture in a Growing Population, .. 
Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Vol.8, August-
September, 1959, pp. 1-11. 
2Govt. of India, India: A Reference Annual, Publication Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 
1964, p. 157. 
3Govt. of India, Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture, 
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1953, p. 433. 
I 
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TABLE III:2 
Pattern of Livelihood in India 
Group 1951 Census 1961 Census 
in Mill ions Per- in Mill ions Per-
of Peo~le centage of Peo~le centage 
1 2 3 4 5 
Total Agricultural 
Population 249.0 69.8 298.5 68.0 
Production Other than 
Agricultural Population 37.7 10.5 49.2 11.2 
Commerce 21.3 6.0 28.5 6.5 
Transport 5.6 1.6 7.9 1.8 
Others 43.0 12.1 54.9 12.5 
Totals 361.0 100.0 439.0 100.0 
Source: Dayal, Rajeswar, Community Development Program in India, 
Kitab Mahal, Private Limited, Allahabad, 1966. 
India: A Reference Annual, 1964, p.225. 
Notes: *Excluding the population of Dadra and Nager Haveli, Diu, Daman 
and Goa. 
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families. For millions of persons born in rural districts there is no 
escape from an agricultural career, while other industries are selective 
and attract roughly that number of candidates who can be profitably 
employed. Agriculture starts with too many candidates; neither selection 
nor rejection is possible----after all, where wculd the rejected go? 
Thus, the farmer is forced to remain on the farm without any consi-
deration as to whether it is remunerative or not. 
C) Source of Foodgrains 
Agriculture has been, and still is, the main source of food supply. 
Increasing demand for food is of major economic significance in an under-
developed country for several reasons. First~ a high rate of popu-
lation growth of 1~ to 3 per cent is now a characteristic of most of the 
underdeveloped nations. This is particularly true in India. 1 Another 
reason is that the income elasticity of demand for food in countries like 
India is considerably higher than in more advanced countries----probably 
in the order of 0.6 or higher in the backward countries vs. 0.2 or 0.3 
in advanced countries, such as Western Europe, the United States of 
America and Canada. 2 
If food supplies fail to expand pari pasu with the growth of pro-
duction the result is likely to be a substantial rise in food prices 
1In India, according to the 1961 Census, population increased by 
2.1 per cent per annum (average rate) during 1951-1961. An estimated 
figure for 1971 shows that during the decade of 1961-1971, population 
increased by 2.4 per cent per annum (average rate). 
2Johnston, B. F. and J. W. Mellor, 11The Nature of Agriculture•s 
Contributions to Economic Development, .. Food Research Institute Studies, 
November 1960, p. 339. 
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leading to political discontent and pressure on wage rates with consequent 
adverse effects on industrial profits, investment and economic growth. 
The inflationary impact of a given percentage increase in food prices is 
much more severe in an underdeveloped country like India than in a develop-
ed country. This is a simple consequence of the dominant position of 
food as a wage good in low income countries where 50 to 60 per cent of 
total consumption expenditure is devoted to food, compared with 20 to 30 
per cent in developed countries. 
In a predominantly agricultural economy like India undergoing trans-
formation under the impact of a planned process of industrialization, the 
quality and the quantity of foodgrains available assume special importance. 
It should not be forgotten that the rate at which industrial development 
and urbanization take place is necessarily preconditioned by the rate of 
increase in the supplies of marketable surplus of foodgrains. If the 
food supply is more than sufficient, there exists an agriculturai surplus, 
and labour may be free from the land for employment in manufacturing. 
Labour supply is divided between the two sectors in a straightforward 
manner: (1) if there is no agricultural surplus. then all labour remains 
on the land; and (2) if an agricultural surplus can be generated, a labour 
force available for employment in manufacturing grows at a rate which is 
equal to the rate of growth of the agricultural surplus. 1 
A developing economy, with an expanding industrial sector, requires 
a quantitative and qualitative increase in foodgrain production for 
feeding her working force. The process of industrialization, buttressed 
1Jorgenson, D. W., 11The Development of a Dual Economy, 11 Economic 
Journal, Vol .71, 1961, p. 312. 
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by an ambitious type of development planning, tends toward investment 
activities in the sphere of heavy and basic industries. The net result 
is that a shortage of necessary consumer goods will develop throughout 
the econemy and a food shortage may become quite acute. 
Under the pressure of a fast-growing population and general Indian 
eating habits, this might develop to be much more serious. As previously 
mentioned, most of the people in India do not eat meat,and therefore, 
India requires more foodgrains. The increasing population is a basic 
limiting factor in industrial expansion and increases the importance of 
foodgrain production. India•s population increased from 361 million in 
1951 to 439 million in 1961 and estimated figure for 1971 is approximately 
540 million. This is an increase of about 78 million people in one 
decade (1961-71). This additional population is larger than the total 
population of Great Britain or Western Germany and is nearly four times 
greater than the population of Canada. This tremendous population increase 
constitutes a constant pressure operating upon the economy of India which 
cannot be lightly ignored. 
There are a number of reasons for this increase in population----
climatic conditions, marriage at an early age, joint family system and 
social customs. It is evident that farmers like to have more children 
to help on the farm. Moreover, especially in the village community, the 
uneducated people•s religious belief is so strong that they refrain from 
putting family planning into practice. 
Tc say this massive population needs a tremendous amount of food is 
an understatement. India has been under pressure to import foodgrains 
as it is an underdeveloped country with a backward agricultural sector 
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not producing sufficient foodgrains to feed her people. Table III:3 
shows the distribution of expenditure on imported foodgrains between 
1949-50 and 1966-67. To pay for these imported foodgrains, India required 
to spend vast quantities of funds which are desperately needed for other 
areas of development. 
In spite of 3 million tons of imported foodgrains, the amount of 
foodgrains available per capita per day was only 17~ ounces. This is 
below the 25 ounces recommended by the United Nations• nutritionists. 
The Planning Commission, at the commencement of the Third Plan, reported 
that nearly 60 per cent of India's population earns much less than the 
national average of Rs.300.00 per capita. 1 At the same time, nutrition 
experts reported that, on the average, each individual needed to consume 
Rs.420.00 worth of food a year to meet the minimum nutritional require-
ment and to maintain proper health. With regard to the causes of 
increasing population, Mr. J. De Castro claims that there is a direct 
correlation between hunger and fertility. 2 Unless there is quantitative 
and qualitative improvement in foodgrain production, fertility and popu-
lation planning will not be free from the negative impact of hunger. 
Therefore, it is imperative that India should develop its agriculture 
at least to the extent that is necessary to abolish hunger. 
1Planning Commission, Draft Outline of the Third Five Year Plan, 
Publication Branch, Government of India Press, New Delh~, 1961, p. 12. 
2castro, J. De, Geography of Hunger, with a forward by Lord Boyd 
Orr, Gollancz, London, 1952. 
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TABLE III:3 
Imports of Foodgrains 
Year Rice Wheat 
1 2 3 
in millions of Rs. 
1949-50 312 712 
1950-51 230 371 
1951-52 382 1,524 
1952-53 430 818 
1953-54 133 383 
1954-55 549 131 
1955-56 47 119 
1956-57 57 14 
1957-58 NA NA 
1958-59 408 1,154 
1959-60 163 1,298 
1960-61 224 1,532 
1961-62 187 939 
1962-63 270 1,138 
1963-64 375 1,348 
1964-65 402 2,419 
1965-66 419 2,647 
1966-'67* 756 3,852 
Source: Kulkarni, V. G. and D. D. Deshpande, Q£. Cit., p. 229. 
Notes: NA=Not Available. 
*provisional. 
Total 
1,024 
501 
1,906 
1,248 
516 
680 
166 
NA 
606 
1,562 
1,461 
1,756 
1,126 
1,406 
1,723 
2,821 
3,066 
4,608 
58 
D) Share of Agricultural Commodities in 
Indian International Trade 
Expansion of agricultural trade is likely to be one of the most 
promising means of increasing incume and augmenting foreign exchange for 
a country which is intensifying its efforts to develop. 
11 In most of the less developed countries agriculture provides 
employment for more than one-half of the labour force and it 
accounts for three-fourths or more of the total foreign exchange 
earnings. Hence, the economic growth of some developing 
countries is dependent upon agricultural exports. 111 
Trade in general, and agricultural exports in particular, have been and 
still are important in these countries where economic development has 
not been as rapid as in the more advanced countries. 
The failure of trade to play a leading role in development can be 
attributed, in part, to the low rate of increase in the demand for agri-
cultural and other primary products. This slow increase in demand is 
related to the low income elasticity, the development of substitutes, the 
use of smaller quantities of raw materials per unit of finished product, 
and the protection of domestic agriculture in the more advanced countries. 
However, the net foreign exchange earned by agricultura1 exports is of 
considerable importance in the development of underdeveloped countries. 
As Table III:4 indicates, India's major exports consist of agri-
cultural products. Between 1950-51 and 1968-69, the percentage share of 
agricultural products (including little or no processing at all) in the 
total volume of exports showed an increase for a short period and then 
1Johnson, D. C., 11Agriculture and Foreign Economic Policy, .. 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 46/2, 1964, p. 919. 
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TABLE III :4 
Share of Agricultural Commodities 
in the Total Export of India 
Year Agricultural Agri. Content Full Value of (2)+(3) 
Colmlodities of Exported Exported Manu- as %of 
as % of Manufactures factures Inc- Total 
Total Export as %:of l uded in (3) Export 
Tota 1 Export as %of 
Total ExEort 
1 2 3 4 5 
1951-52 43 18 57 61 
1952-53 43 19 57 62 
1954-5§ 52 18 48 70 
1956-51 50 18 50 68 
1958-59~ 47 20 53 67 
1960-61 45 23 55 68 
1962-63 45 21 55 66 
1964-65 46 24 54 70 
1966-67 44 24 56 68 
1968-69* 42 27 58 69 
Source: Kulkarni, V. G. and D. D. Deshpande, 2£. Cit., pp. 224-228. 
Sengupta, J. K. and A, Sen, India's Economic Growth:: 
Process, Problems and Policies, The Post-Graduate Book Mart, 
t alcutta-9, 1961. 
Notes: *Estimated figures. 
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reverted downward again. The percentage share of manufactures with agri-
cultural content tended to remain stable up to 1956-57 and then started 
to decline. This indicates that agricultural production and exports play 
an important role in the economy of India not only as an export resource 
but also as the raw material for the important industries which are 
producing export goods. 
E) Interdependence of Agriculture and Industry 
Economic historians have supplied data which help to analyze the 
issue of whether the agricultural or industrial sector shn~ld be relied 
upon as the driving force in development. They ·,generally concur that 
there are no cases of successful development of a major country in which 
a rise in agricultural produc~ivity did not preceed or accompany industrial 
development. 1 It becomes more and more apparent that development over 
the long run is not likely to occur if it is tied to either an agricultural 
or an industrial foundation. Today it is recognized that there is no 
basis for doctrinaire statements that development should be launched with 
either agricultural or industrial expansion; instead, 11 every economy has 
an agricultural and a non-agricultural sector, and one of the most 
important aspects of development is the changing, complex but always 
intimate relation between the two. 112 Anyway, in the Indian case agri-
culture seems to be the more logical starting point. No doubt, the 
1Kuznets, Simon. Six Lectures on Economic Growth, The Free Press 
of Glencoe, New· York, 1959, pp. 59-60. 
2Youngson, A. J., Possibilities of Economic Progress, Cambridge 
University Press, London, 1959, p. 284. 
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eventual development of india could not be achieved without industria-
lization. 
Thus, the close interdependence of agriculture and industry has 
always existed in any society, although its patterns have undergone many 
changes in the course of economic evolution. It is too simple to say that 
one period of economic history is agricultural and that another is 
industrial. Even in the so-called •agricultural stage• the activities 
of artisans and craftmen cannot be downgraded. Some of these artisans 
were concentrated in small towns; the farm households supplied a large 
amount of part-time labour, which was often confused with, and treated 
as, agricultural labour. On the other hand, in the so-called modern 
industrial stage, the importance of agriculture as a source of food and 
raw materials can hardly be ignored. 
11An international comparison of the share of mcjor sectors in 
national products reveals a negative correlation between the level 
of income and agriculture•s share in it, and a positive cor-
relation between the level of income and the share of non-
agricultural commodity production. As the level of per capita 
increases, the share of agriculture in national product drops 
and that of industry rises. 111 
Agriculture, as a field of production, may be linked with industry 
by raw materials. In this respect, agriculture serves as a supply 
source, while industry serves as a demand source. As was mentioned 
previously, in India, the agricultural sector provides raw material to 
the five major industries, namely, jute,sugar, cotton, tea and oilseeds, 
which play an important role in the development of the Indian economy 
1Kunets, Simon, 11 Quantitative Aspects of Economic Growth of 
Nations, .. Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol~ 5, July 1957, 
pp. 37-38. 
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by providing employment and contributing a large share to the Indian 
international balance of payments. (See Table III:5). 
F) Agriculture•s Contribution to Capital Formation 
A secular decline in agriculture and the structural transformation 
of an economy that characterize the dynamics of growth underscore the 
importance and the difficulty of capital accumulation in an under-
developed country. Since India is making a determined effort to achieve 
economic progress, she faces the formidable requirements of capital to 
finance the creation and expansion of manufacturing and mining enter-
prises, of overhead investment in transportation and utilities and of 
revenue needed for recurrent expenditure for expansion of education and 
development services. These requirements are certain to outstrip the 
supply of funds available, particularly in the absence of large earnings 
from petroleum or mineral exports or through favourable access to foreign 
capital. The sheer size of the agricultural sector, which is the only 
major existing economic activity, points out its importance as a source 
of capital for over all economic growth. 
Since there is a scope for rising productivity in agriculture by 
means that require only moderate capital outlays, it is possible for the 
agricultural sector to make a net contribution to the capital require-
ments for infrastructure and for industrial expansion without reducing 
the low levels of consumption characteristic of the farm population. 
An increase in agricultural productivity implies some combination 
of reduced inputs, reduced agr icultural prices or increased farm receipts. 
Labour, the major input in agriculture in India, is the principal input 
\ 
! 
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TABLE III :5 
Exports of Industrial Products 
with an Agricultural Commodity as a Raw Material 
Year Cotton Yarn '. ! Jute Sugar Total %of 
and Cotton Manufactures Total 
Piece Goods Ex~ort 
1 2 3 ll 5 6 
in millions of Rs 
1950-51 1,338 1,140 2 2,480 39.22 
1951-52 537 2,655 4 3,196 43.31 
1952-53 666 1,289 44 1,999 34.63 
1953-54 685 1,138 1 1,824 34.38 
1954-55 636 1,238 4 1,828 31.70 
1955-56 608 1,183 10 1,801 30.20 
1956-57 650 1,992 10 2,652 43.83 
1957-58 623 1,103 23* 1,749 27.51 
1958-59 467 1,018 37 1,522 26.21 
1959-60 653 1,099 25 1.777 27.79 
1960-61 620 1,351 33 2,004 30.35 
1961-62 428 1,438 153 2,019 29.70 
1962-63 514 1,546 179 2,239 31.38 
1963-64 601 1,563 272 2,436 30.71 
1964-65 691 1,671 215 2,577 31.57 
1965-66 696 1,828 119 2,643 32.65 
1966-67** 729 2,355 154 3·,238 29.60 
Source: Kulkarni, V. G. and D. D. Deshpande, .QE. Cit., pp. 226-227 • 
Notes: *Estimated unofficial figure. 
**Provisional. 
that will be reduced. Attention has already been given to agriculture's 
role as a source of manpower. Implicit in the earlier discussion of the 
need for expanding agricultural production was the important proposition 
that stable or reduced agricultural prices can facilitate capital accu-
mulation by preventing deterioration of or even improving, the terms of 
trade on which the industrial sector obtains food and other agricultural 
products. 
In short, in India, where agriculture accounts for some 48 per cent 
of the total national income, the transition from a level of saving and 
investment that implies stagnation to one permitting growth cannot be 
achieved unless agriculture makes a significant net contribution to 
capital formation in the expanding sectors. 
CHAPTER IV 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
DURING THE FIRST THREE FIVE YEAR PLANS 
The central objective of planning· in India was started as initi-
ating a process of development which will raise living standards and 
open up new opportunities for a richer and more varied life. Economic 
planning, therefore, had to be viewed as an integral part of a wider 
process aiming not merely at the development of resources, in a narrow 
technical sense, but at the development of human facilities and the 
building up of an institutional frame work adequate to the needs and 
aspirations of the people. 
The economy of India had many storms on all fronts----agriculture, 
industry and services----that made the period of Nehru's leadership a 
checkered one. The rise in population, floods and droughts, the long 
gestation period of the key industries, the underdeveloped agricultural 
sector, and the pressing need for more and more investments all continue 
to exert pressures. As a matter of fact, some of the above problems are 
very difficult to solve in short term planning. Taking this premise into 
consederation, the Government of India decided to introduce long term 
planning and, therefore, in March, 1950, the P.lanning Commission was 
created with Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru as its Chairman. In July, 1950, the 
Planning Commission presented the draft outline of the First Five Year 
Plan. 
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A) First Five Year Plan : from 1951-52 to 1955-56 
The First Five Year Plan was conceived with modest aims. Its main 
pre-occupations were the prevailing inflationary situation and the exist 
ing food shortage. But, in several directions, it set into motion 
new social and economic processes which helped to raise the nation•s 
standard of living and to give its people opportunities for a better and 
more varied life. In short, the First Plan primarily aimed at increasing 
productivity in agriculture and reducing income inequalities. 
Policy of Allocations 
Originally, the First Plan proposed an outlay of Rs.20.69 billion 
for the pub1ic sector and Rs.13 billion for the private sector,1 but 
this figure for the public sector wa$ later raised to Rs.23.78 billion. 
However, the actual amount spent, in spite of this upgrading, did not 
exceed the original amount provided. The Planning Commission•s review 
of the First Plan states that there was an expenditure of only Rs.20.12 
billion. When price changes were taken into account, the public 
expenditure during the First Plan period amounted to no more than 
Rs.19.60 billion, while the private sector accounted for Rs.14.29 
billion. 2 
In the First Plan, Rs.3,540 million (14.9 per cent) was provided 
to the agricultural sector including community development program, 
1oetailed figures for the private sector are not available. There-
fore, this figure of Rs.13 billion is substracted from the total invest-
ment of Rs.33.69 billion in the First Plan. 
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Rs.6,470 million (27.2 per cent) to irrigation and power, Rs.1,880 
million (7.9 per cent) to industry, Rs.5,320 million (24 per cent) to 
social welfare services . and Rs.860 million (3.6 per cent) to the 
miscelleneous items. (See Columns 2 and 3 of Table IV:l). 
As Table IV:l shows, the agricultural sector received the highest 
priority in the First Plan. An allocation of Rs.lO.Ol billion (42.1 
per cent) was made for the agricultural sector; however, the actual 
outlay was 44 per cent. 1 The First Plan•s emphasis on agricultural 
production was fully justified because in the pre-planning period there 
was a tremendous food shortage in the country. Agricultural production 
had to be stepped up in order to make India more than self-sufficient 
in foodgrains and raw material and to enhance the process of industria-
lization. Thus, the main aim of the First Plan was to develop the agri-
cultural sector and to become self-sufficient in foodgrain production. 
Sources of Finance 
lndia•s First Plan was mainly a plan of public enterprise for 
development purposes, and therefore, it naturally involved financial 
planning and the raising of necessary funds to meet the proposed 
expenditures. 
The original financial allocations of the First Plan revealed that, 
to finance the outlay of Rs.20.69 billion, the Central and State govern-
ments would raise about Rs.12.58 billion through borrowing and budgetary 
sources. This meant that, after tapping the normal sources (i.e. some 
1Agricultural sector includes the community development program 
and multipurpose irrigation and power projects. 
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TABLE IV:1 
Allocation and Outlay in the First Five Year Plan 
Major Heads of Plan Provision* Outlay 
Development in Mil- Per- in Mil- Per-
1 ions of cent 1 ions of cent 
Rs. Rs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Agriculture (including 
Community Development 3,540 14.9 2,990 14.8 
Irrigation and Power 6,470 27.2 5,850 29.1 
Industries and Mining 1,880 7.9 1,000 5.0 
Transportation and 
Communication 5,710 24.0 5,320 26.4 
Social Services 5,320 22.4 4,230 21.0 
Miscelleneous 860 3.6 730 3.7 
Totals 23,780 100.0 20,120** 100.0 
Source: Planning Commission, Review of the First Five Year Plan, 
Publication Branch, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 
1957, pp. 2-3. 
Notes: *Including adjustments. 
**Figures for the fifth year of the Plan period are based on 
11 revised estimates ... When these figures are properly adjusted 
the actual outlay over the five year period would be about 
Rs.19.6 billion. 
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public borrowing, taxation, etc.), there would be a gap of Rs.8.11 
billion. To cover this gap, deficit financing .of Rs.2.9 billion had to 
be undertaken. Even then there was a net gap of Rs.5.21 billion which 
was expected to be bridged by external assistance, additional borrowing 
and additional deficit financing. 
As was stated earlier, the size of the First Plan was increased to 
Rs.23.78 billion; as a result of which the original gap of Rs.5.21 billion 
was increased to Rs.8.3 billion. The total budgetary resources availabl e 
during the First Plan were about Rs.12.77 billion. Thus, budgetary 
resources came close to the original expectations, which were Rs.12.58 
billion. External assistance amounted to Rs.2.03 billion. Consequently, 
the extent of necessary deficit financing had to exceed the limit of 
Rs.2.9 billion. The total amount of deficit financing undertaken during 
the First Plan period came to Rs.4.20 billion. (See Table IV:2). 
B) Second Five Year Plan : from 1956-57 to 1960-61 
Looking at the basic strategy of India's Second Five Year Plan, we 
find that there was a marked emphasis on the basi~ capital goods indus-
tries. Nearly 20 per cent of the total outlay was on these industries. 
Expenditure under large-scale industries, scientific research, and 
mineral exploration and development was about Rs.600 million during the 
First Plan; whereas, in the Second Plan, which was geared to initiating 
a bold program of industrialization, Rs.6,900 million was allocated to 
industrial development. 
Policy of Allocations 
The proposed development outlay of the Central and State govern-
ments amounted to Rs.48 billion {public sector only) in the Second Plan 
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TABLE IV:2 
Finance for the Public Sector 
in the First Five Year Plan 
4Major Reads of Source Finance 
in Billions Percentage 
of Rs. of the Total 
1 ~ 2 3 
Taxation and the surplus of the 
Railways 7.52 38.37 
Market borrowing 2.05 10.46 
Small savings and unfunded debts 3.04 15.51 
Other cpital receipts 0.91 4.64 
External assistance 1.88 9.59 
Deficit financing 4.20 21.43 
Totals 19.60 100.00 
Source: Planning Commission, Review of the First Five Year Plan, 
Publicatdon Branch, Government of India ~ Press, New Delhi , 
1957' pp. 39-47. 
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as compared with the target figure of Rs.23.78 billion in the First Plan. 
The private sector accounted for Rs.31 billion,1 which gives the total 
outlay of Rs.79 billion for the Second Plan .. But, at the end of the Plan, 
it was realized that the investment made in the Second Plan was only of 
Rs.67.5 billion (Rs.36.5 billion for the public sector and Rs.31 billion 
for the private sector). The distribution of the outlay by major 
sections of development is shown in Table IV:3. Investment during the 
two plan periods (1951-52 to ~96Q-61) totalling Rs.101.1 billion ----
Rs.66.12 billion in the public sector and Rs.34.98 billion in the private 
sector----increased the average annual investment in the economy from 
Rs.5 billion at the beginning of the decade to Rs.16 billion at the end. 
Expenditure in the agricultural sector (agriculture, power, community 
development program. and irrigation) during the Second Plan amounted to 
Rs.13.95 billion, i.e. 30.32 per cent of the total investment, as against 
the provision of Rs.14.81 billion. (See Table IV:3). 
Tentatively, in the original draft of the Second Plan, the target 
for the agricultural sector was fixed at 75 million tons of food pro-
duction, 5.5 million tons of oilseeds, 9.5 million tons of sugarcane (in 
terms of gur), 3.2 million bales of cotton and 4.7 million bales of jute. 
To reach these targets, more emphasis should have been placed on the 
agricultural sector, but this was not done, which can be seen from Table 
IV:3. 
Even in the objectives of the Second Plan, agriculture is not 
mentioned at all. It says that the main objectives of the Second Plan 
are: 
\ 
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TABLE IV:3 
Provisions and Expenditures f•.1r the Major Heads of Development 
in the Second Five Year Plan* 
Major Heads of Provisions** Ex~...;nditure 
Development in Bill ions Per- in Bi - . . Per-
of Rs. centage lions of centage 
Rs. 
1 2 3 5 
Agriculture and 
Community Development 5.68 11.83 5.30 11.52 
Irrigation and Power 9.13 19.00 8.65 18.80 
Industry and Mining 8.90 18.54 10.75 23.37 
Transportation and 
Communications 13.85 28.85 13.00 28.26 
Social Services 9.45 19.69 . 7.45 16.20 
Miscelleneous 0.99 2.06 0.85 1.85 
Totals 48.00 100.00 46.00 100.00 
Source: Planning Commission, Second Five Year Plan, Publication Branch, 
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1956, p. 35. 
Notes: *In the public sector only. 
**Includes all adjustments made during the First Five Year Plan 
period. 
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1) an increase of 25 per cent in the national income; 
2) rapid industrialization with particular emphasis on the 
development of basic and heavy industries; 
3) a large expansion of employment opportunities; and 
4) a reduction of inequalities in income and wealth and a more 
even distribution of economic power.1 
In view of the increasing demand for food and raw materials,because 
of increasing population and an expanding industrial sector, the targets 
provided for in the original draft were found to be somewhat low and in-
adequate. Therefore, the government, soon after commencement of the 
Second Plan, revised most of the agricultural production targets upward 
to meet the expected demand. The revised targets were placed at 80.5 
million tons of foodgrain production, 6 million tons of oilseeds, 10.2 
million tons of sugarcane (in terms of gur), 5.2 million bales of jute 
and 4.2 million bales of cotton. 2 
Sources of Finance 
The original scheme of financing envisaged by the Planning Commi-
ssion for the development programs of the public sector amounted to 
Rs.4J billion, as shown in Table IV:4. As this Table shows, the budget 
ary funds expected to be raised by the Central and State governments 
through taxation, borrowing and other receipts amounted to Rs.24 billion. 
A further Rs.12 billion was expected to come through further domestic 
deficit financing. In addition, another Rs.8 billion was to be raised 
externally, bringing the total to Rs.44 billion for the public sector 
1Govt. of India, India: A Reference Annual, Publicati on Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 
1960, p. 196. 
2Ibid., pp. 197-198. 
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TABLE IV:4 
Financial Resources (Expected) for the Second Five Year Plan 
Items 
1 
Surplus from current revenue: 
At existing (1955-56) rates of taxation 
Additional taxation 
Borrowing from the public: 
Market loans 
Small savings 
Budgetary sources: 
Railway's contribution to the development programs 
Provident funds and other deposits 
Resources should be raised externally: 
Deficit financing: 
Gap: (to be covered by additional measures to raise 
domestic resources) 
Total 
Source: India: A Reference.·Annual. 1954, pp. 165-166. 
Income 1n 
Billions 
·?of Rs. 
8.00 
3.50 
4.50 
12.00 
7.00 
5.00 
4.00 
1.50 
2.50 
8.00 
12.00 
4 ,00 
48.00 
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in the Second Plan. This left a balance of Rs.4 billion to be raised. 
The Planning Commission felt that this gap should ultimately be br~dged by 
raising the domestic quota. They also felt that the only possible 
sources from which this deficit could be filled were taxation and the 
profits of public enterprises. However, the realized sources of finance 
were somewhat different from the original ones. (See Tables IV:4 and 
IV:5). 
C) Third Five Year Plan : from 1961-62 to 1965-66 
The Third Five Year Plan has a particular importance because the 
border conflict with China in 1962 compelled the government of India to 
declare a state of national emergency and diverted considerable expendi-
ture toward defence. Again in 1965, the border conflict with Pakistan 
forced India to spend more money on defence. Consequently, the develop-
ment programs of the Third Plan were retarded. 
Policy of Allocations 
In view of the rapid growth of population in the 1951-61 decade, 
the Third Plan laid down the following long term objectives to be 
achieved by 1975: (1) a cumulative rate of growth as near as possible 
to 6 per cent per annum so as to secure a more than doubling of the 
national income (from Rs. 145 billion in 1960-61 to Rs340 billion in 
1975-76 at 1960-61 prices) and a 61 per cent increase in per capita 
income (from Rs.330 in 1960-61 to Rs.530 in 1975-76); (2) the creation 
of employment outside the agricultural sector for about 46 billion per-
sons in order to reduce the proportion of the population dependent upon 
agriculture from approximately 70 per cent to at least 60 per cent; 
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TABLE IV:5 
Financial Resources (Realized) for the Second Five Year Plan 
Items 
1 
Balance from current revenue (excluding additional 
taxes). 
Contribution of the railways on the existing basis. 
Surplus of other public enterprises on the 
existing basis. 
Loans from the public (net). 
Small savings. 
Provident funds (net). 
Steel equilization fund (net). 
Balance of Miscelleneous capital receipts. 
Additional taxation~(including measures to increase 
the surplus of public enterprises). 
Budgetary receipts corresponding to external 
assistance. 
Deficit financing. 
Total 
Income in 
Billions 
of Rs. 
-0.50 
1.50 
----* 
7.80** 
4.00 
1.70 
0.38 
0.22 
10.50 
10.90@ 
9.48 
48.00 
Source: Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan, Publication Branch, 
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1961, pp. 191-193. 
Notes: *Included in the item, 11 Balance of miscelleneous c~pital 
receipts," above. 
**Includes investment by the State Bank of India, out of 
PL 480 funds. 
@Includes investment of PL 480 funds by the Reserve Bank of 
India in special securities in 1960-61. 
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and (3) the provision of universal education up to the age of 14 years 
as envisaged in the constitution. 1 
The total investment in the economy during the Third Plan period 
was set at Rs.104 billion (63 billion for the public sector and Rs.41 
billion for the private sector), a little more than the total expenditure 
of the first two Plan periods, which was Rs.101 billion. 2 The pattern 
of investment in the Third Plan, by major areas of development, is shown 
in Table IV:6. 
As this Table shows, more emphasis was given to heavy and basic 
industries (including power) and social services. For example, Rs.36.32 
b1llion (34.92 per cent) was allocated to heavy industries, minerals 
and power, whereas the amount to be spent on social services was 
Rs.16.97 (16.32 per cent). On the other hand, a comparatively smaller 
amount of Rs.21.10 billion (20.29 per cent) was allocated to the agri-
cultural sector (including the community development program, irrigation 
and flood control). The amount allocated to transportation and communi-
cations ~as ~ Rs.17.36 (16.69 per cent), comparatively less than the 
amount of Rs.13. billion (28.26 per cent) in the Second Plan. 
The Third Plan provided for an outlay on production programs in the 
agricultural sector (including the community development program, irri-
gation and flood control) of approximately Rs.21.10 billion, which is 
1Govt. of India, India: A Reference Annual, Publicatdon Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 
1969, p. 207. 
2see Tables IV:2 and IV:3, where the outlays which were made in the 
public sector only are shown, i.e. a total of Rs.67.60 billion, while the 
private sector amounted to Rs.33.5 billion. Thus, the total amount for 
the First and Second Plan periods came to Rs.101.1 billion. 
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TABLE IV:6 
Pattern of Investment During the Third Five Year Plan 
Major Heads of Public Private Total Percent 
DeveloEment Sector Sector 
1 2 3 4 5 
in billions of Rs. 
Agriculture and allied field 6.60 8.00 14.60 14.04 
Irrigation, and flood control 6.50 6.50 6.25 
Power 10.12. 0.50 10.62 10.21 
Village and small industries 1.50 2.75 4.25 4.09 
Large industries and Minerals 15.20 10.50 25.70 24.71 
Transportation and 
communications 14.86 2.50 17.36 16~.;69 
Social services and other 
programs 6.22 10.75 16.97 16.32 
Inventories 2.00 6.00 8.00 7.69 
Totals 63.00 41.00 104.00 100.00 
Source: India: A Reference Annual, 1969, p. 217. 
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20.29 per cent of the total investment of the Plan. If power were inclu-
ded in the agricultural sector, then the amount allocated to agriculture 
would be Rs.33.32 billion (31.94 per cent). In the Second Plan, it was 
only Rs.13.95 billion (30.32 per cent) and in the First Plan it was 
Rs.lO.Ol billion (43.9 per cent). 1 
The Third Plan aimed at stepping up the rate of expansion of agri-
cultural output from the 3 per cent per annum achieved in the Second Plan 
to 6 per cent per annum. 
Sources of Finance 
As was pointed out earlier, during the Third Plan period the initial 
problem for the public sector was of raising the necessary funds amounting 
to Rs.75 billion. But, as shown in Table IV:7, due to some changes infue 
Plan structure, the final estimate went up to Rs.86.30 billion; whereas 
the final figure for expenditure in the Third P~an shows that the total 
amount spent by the government was Rs.104 billion. This was due to two 
border conflicts mentioned before. The details of financial resources 
of the Third Plan are shown in Table IV:?. 
D) Neglected Aspects of Agricultural Development 
in the Three Five Year Plans 
In the previous sections, the policy of the government for allo-
cation of funds among different sectors and development programs of the 
economy was stated. 
1see Table IV:l and IV:3. The figures given in this paragraph are 
for the public sector only. 
! -
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TABLE IV:7 
Financial Resources for the Third Five Year Plan 
Source of Finance 
1 
Balance from current revenue at 
1960-61 rates of taxation. 
Contribution of the railways at 
1960-61 prices of fares and freights. 
Surplus of the public enterprises at 
1960-61 prices of products. 
Loans from the public (net) . 
Small savings. 
Unfunded debts (net). 
Compulsor.y deposits and annuity deposits~ 
Steel equilization fund (net). 
Miscelleneous capital receipts (net). 
Original 
Scheme of 
Financing 
2 
Latest 
Estimates 
3 
in billions of Rs. 
5.50 
1.50 
4.50 
8.00 
6.00 
2.65 
1.05 
1.70 
-4.70 
0.80 
3.95 
9.15 
5.85 
3.40 
1.15 
0. 35 
1.50 
Additional taxation (including measures to the 
to the surplus of public enterprise). 17.10 28.80 
Budgetary receipts corresponding to 
external assistance. 
Deficit financing. 
Totals 
22.00 
5.00 
75.00 
24.55 
11.50 
86.30 
Source: Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draf t Outline, 
Publication Branch, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 
1968', pp. 57-58. 
Notes: *These were introduced subsequent to the formulation of the 
Third Plan. 
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During the three Plan periods from1951-52 to 1965-66 an investment 
of Rs.131.12 billion was made. 1 The agriculture and community develop-
ment program received Rs.15.27 billion (11.65 per cent), irrigation and 
power received Rs.31.60 billion (24.1 per cent), and industry and mining 
received Rs.26.60 billion (20.29 per cent). (See Table IV:8). 
In 1951, on the eve of the First Plan, the agricultural situation 
was extremely bad. The question which takes on great significance here 
is 11Shoul d priority be given to agriculture or to industry?.. This 
question, which can always provide lively debate between the exponents 
of the different ideologies when a development program is being prepared, 
had particular importance. The echoes of the Bengal famine of 1943 re-
verberated in the background and only by massive imports could further 
trouble be held off. This critical situation was reflected in the form 
of the Plan in which government officials gave agriculture, including 
irrigation and power, topmost priority. 2 
But there were even more profound reasons behind this decision to 
concentrate on agriculture. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the 
relationship between population and agricultural production had been 
deteriorating. 3 The first sign of this was that India gradually stopped 
exporting cerials. For example, during the 188o•s, India exported an 
1This figure is for public sector only. 
2Planning Commission, First Five Year Plan, Publication Branch, 
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1950, p. 44. 
3Between 1981 and 1921, a sort of demographic 11 Squeeze11 took place, 
the population remaining more or less stationary as a result of serious 
famines and epidemics. Since 1921, the increase has been continuous 
and progressive. For more detail see Census of India, paper No.1, 1962. 
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TABLE IV:8 
Allocation and Outlay During the Three Plan Period 
MaJOr Heads of F1rst Second Third Total Per-
DeveloQment Plan Plan Plan centage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
in billions of Rs. 
Agriculture (including 
Community Development 
Program). 2.99 5.68 6.60 15.27 11.65 
Irrigation and Power 5.85 9.13 16.62 31.60 24.10 
Industries and Mining 1.00 8.90 16.70 26.60 20.29 
Transportation and 
Communication . 5.32 13.85 14.86 34.03 25.95 
Social Services 4.23 9.45 6.22:... 19.90 15.18 
Miscelleneous 0.72 0.99 2.00 3.72 2.83 
Totals 20.12 48.00 63.00 131.12 100.00 
Source: Calculated from Tables IV:l, IV:3 and IV:6 of this Chapter. 
Notes: *This Table shows the outlay in the public sector only. 
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average of 1.2 million tons of foodgrains per year. Between 1905 and 
1910, the figure fell to 520,000 tons. Subsequently, India had to import 
160,000 tons a year during 1920-25, then 1.2 million tons during 1930-35. 
In post-war years, the annual imports reached about 3 million tons. At 
the same time, the land cultivated per head of population began to fall. 
The figure dropped more than 20 per cent between 1921 and 1951. 1 All 
the evidence shows that it ·ts necessary to develop the agricultural 
sector, which provides nearly one-half of the national income. 
But, at the end of the First Plan, situation had improved appre-
ciably because weather conditions were favourable during the year 1952-53, 
after exceptionally grave natural calamities in the beginning of the First 
Plan and because the efforts by the government and peasants had produced 
tangible results, thanks to the priority granted to the agricultural 
sector in the First Plan. 
Planning for increased agricultural production was a great success 
in the First Plan. Agricultural output went up by 18 per cent during 
this period. However, there were some inefficiencies in the First Plan, 
mainly due to the fact that systematic and comprehensive crop planning 
was almost neglected . Under crop planning, targets for various agricul-
tural commodities have to be fixed and it is also necessary to decide in 
advance what agricultural holdings should be earmarked for each commodity 
and what two or three crops will be growing on the same holding in a year. 
The Planning Commission was aware of the importance of crop planning but, 
1For more detail, see Census of India, Vol.!, particularly 11General 
Report, .. pp. 141, 164 and 166, 1951. 
\ 
I 
I -
84 
due to pre-occupation with inflation and food shortage, it could not make 
provision for it in the First Plan. 
Investment in the Second Plan (Rs.46 billion) was more than twice 
as large as in the First Plan (Rs.20.12 billion). 1 This increase was 
accompani~d by a reorganization of the objectives, especially towards the 
industrial sector, with a particular emphasis on heavy industries. The 
industrial sector accounted for 23.37 per cent of the total investments in 
the public sector, as against 5 per cent in the First Plan, while expendi-
ture for agriculture (including the community development program) was 
reduced from 14.88 per cent to 11.52 per cent and that for irrigation and 
power from 29.1 per cent to 18.8 per cent. Thus, in the Second Plan, the 
Planning Commission emphasized the industrial sector and gave less impor-
tance . to the agricultural sector. 
The questions that arise here are: was this slackening of pace on 
the agricultural front justified? Was this the right time to divert the 
attention from agriculture to heavy industries? In this regard, the 
Planning Commission gave its opinion that "while the general trends of 
food production would appear to be upward, it must be admitted that 
favourable seasons have played a notable part and there are substantial 
elements of instability despite the evidence of growth of agricultural 
production."2 The report of the First Plan drew attention to the very 
good monsoons of 1953 and 1954. 
1These figures are for the public sector only. 
2Planning Commission, Review of the First Five Year Plan, Publication 
Branch, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1956, pp. 100-101. 
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However, the four main objectives for the Second Plan were: 
1) to increase the national income by 25 per cent; 
2) to proceed with a rapid industrialization; 
3) to create more employment oppm~tunities; and 
4) to reduce inequalities in wealth and income.n1 
The agricultural sector was not mentioned in the objectives of the 
Second Plan at all. 
We can conclude from this that the Commission did not give much 
importance to the agricultural sector in the Second Plan. It seems that 
the Planning Commission felt at the end of the First Plan that the agri-
cultural sector was now fully developed and there was no need to give 
much attention to it. What they did not realize, however, was that after 
a successful operation it is equally important to take care of a patient, 
since a successful operation does not mean that the patient is, or will 
be, fully recovered. 
Two years later, in 1957-58, adverse climatic conditions resulted 
in a drop in foodgrain production of nearly 10 per cent. This lesson 
of 1958 resulted in increasing emphasis on agriculture. To the four 
primary objectives of the Second Plan, the Third Plan added a fifth: 
to free the country from food imports by achieving an increase of 32 per 
cent in foodgrain production~ This objective was placed second in the 
order of priorities, but it remained only an objective. The Planning 
Commission did not give much importance to the agricultural sector in 
the Thjrd Plan either. (See Table IV:6). 
1Planning Commission, Second Five Year Plan, Publication Branch, 
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1955, p. 24. 
2Govt . of India, India : A Reference Annual, Publication Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1969, 
p. 207. 
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For a less developed economy, a high rate of increase in agri-
cultural production is one of the principal factors for industrial pro-
gress. It is, therefore, necessary to push ahead the agricultural 
sector as fast as possible. But, this was not done in the planning.1 
The fact remains that the Planning Commission, and also many politicians, 
including the late Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, advocated as 
massive an industrialization program as possible. The percentage of 
industrial investment increased to 28.8 per cent of the total invest-
ment in the Third Plan. The proportion of investment in irrigation and 
power decreased from 18.8 per cent in the Second Plan to 16.46 per cent 
in the Third Plan. 
From 1951 to 1961, agricultural production rose faster than the 
population. Statistics are rather unreliable, and certain adjustments 
must be made for the efforts of climatic conditions, but it is fair to 
say that, within the decade, population rose 21.5 per cent, whereas pro-
duction increased 35 to 40 per cent. 2 In the course of Third Plan, 
however, the favourable trend in agriculture was reversed and production 
was outstripped by population increase. Hence, one must take into account 
1see Tables IV:6 and IV:8. 
2The trend indicated may seem quite near the truth, but the same 
does not necessarily apply to actual figures. The National Sample Survey 
(NSS), an independent statistical organization, has arrived at figures : 
much at variance with those of the Ministry of Agriculture. In its 
first Survey (Dec. 1952), it estimated that the official f'lgures were 
some 25 per_cerjt ·below its own calculations. The NSS Report No.73 for 
1958-59 shows a similar discrepancy of 30 per cent. For 1960-61, the 
NSS gives a figure of 96 million tons as opposed to the official figure 
of 82 million tons. As suggested by David Hopper of the Rockfeller 
Foundation in New Delhi, the truth may well lie somewhere between the 
two. 
\ 
I 
i 
I 
l 
I 
I 
87 
the natural conditions, which were extremely unfavourable as compared 
with the 1951-61 decade. Between 1961 and 1966, there were three rela-
tively bad years, one good year, and one----the last----truly cata-
strophic year. 
Many politicians and political economists and the planning Commis-
sion argue that due to two border conflicts, with· China in 1961 and with 
Pakistan in 1965, the Third Plan did not succeeded in achieving its goals 
because attention was drwn toward the defence program. These emergencies 
helped India to realize that the mobilization of resources, both for 
defence and development, should be simultaneously undertaken. Realizing 
the intensity of these pressures, India, therefore, decided to sub-
stantially strengthen her defence. In the first ten years of planning, 
i.e. from 1951 to 1961, India spent Rs.20.74 billion on defence. The 
Indo-China border conflict in 1962 led to almost a doubling of the defence 
expenditure from Rs.3,434 million in 1962-63 to Rs.7,085 million in 
1963-64. In fact, the defence budget for the Third Plan amounted to over 
Rs.28.84 billion. Added to this, the border conflict with Pakistan raised 
the defence budget from Rs.7.178 billion in 1965-66 to over Rs.9 billion 
in 1966-67. 
Thus, national defence and development should not only go hand in 
hand but must be viewed as interdependent. This is to say that India has 
to move forward with her plan of economic development, accompanied by a 
necessary change in the orientation of development,so that the vital 
requirements of defence are met. After two border conflicts, India must 
remodel her d~velopment policy with an eye towards defence, build up the 
industrial base and give proper emphasis to the main elements of productive 
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power such as oi.l supplies, transportation, power generation, supplies 
of basic light metals, food and agricultural raw materials. 
Let us look at the costs and consequences of a big defence build-up 
on the economy of India as she strives toward economic and social develop-
ment. What is intended here is an objective discussion which will help 
to give an understanding of the basic issues. 
It is a well known fact that a marked rise in the production of 
defence goods, unlike capital goods for civilian use cannot enlarge the 
productive capacity of the economy. They are produced not because they 
satisfy the final demand of the consumers but simply because they fulfill 
a certain set of military and strategic cons~derations which are vitally 
important for the protection of the nation as a whole. This means that, 
at any point of time, with given resources, the nation is faced with 
the choice of producing more or less of either defence goods or civilian 
goods. If there is already full utilization of the resources, then, due 
to the priority attached to defence production, consumer goods production 
is bound to suffer. 
Hence, it is necessary to tighten the tax burden more effectively 
and impose an element of forced saving on the community. These two 
things were done in India during the Third Plan in order to finance the 
defence production and put an effective check on domestic consumption. 
This, of course, involved a series of deprivations and sacrifices which 
were the obvious costs of defence preparedness. 
At this stage we may raise an interesting point which if often missed 
or is not fully stressed. In a country like India, where under-utiliza-
tion of resources is a common state of affairs , the general presum~LJon 
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is that it is operating below the optimum limit of productive potential. 
The main reason for under-utilization of resources in India hinges on 
inefficiencies in the organization of the economic system and poor 
administration. These inefficiencies result from market imperfections, 
price-wage rigidities, lack of mobility of resources, etc. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the circumstances surrounding 
Indian development create doubt about the decisive importance attributed 
only to the financial provisions. Would agriculture really have progressed 
much more quickly if it had had the benefit of more capital investment 
freed by a less hasty industrialization? In other words, could not better 
results have been obtained even with the distribution of funds between 
two sectors remaining unchanged? 
It seems that two types of error have been made in planning. First, 
there is a psychological error which has engendered in official circles 
some relaxing of effort with regard to agriculture since the Second Plan. 
When the politicians and numerous economists stress the need for rapid 
industrialization, they seem to misunderstand the initial role of agri-
culture and they forget the truth demonstrated by nineteenth-century 
Europe and Japan, that true industrialization can only take root in the 
round prepared by a relatively high level of agricultural production. 
This is true particularly in the case of the Indian economy. In Russia 
also, the agricultural development that continued from the end of the 
19th century to the First World War facilitated the preference given by 
the Soviets to industry. 1 
1Eicher, C. K. and L. Witt, Q£. Cit., p. 23. 
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A second error of appreciation is the lack of realism in studying 
agricultural problems. For example, according to a statement made by 
Mr. S. K. Patil, the former Minister of Food and Agriculture, in Parlia-
ment in 1960, the imports of American agricultural surplus were temporary 
and that India would be self-sufficient when, thanks to the Third Plan, 
production had reached 105 million tons. 1 The experience of the Third 
Plan did not justify such statements, which made no mention of a possible 
gap between theoretical and actual achievement. 2 
Other weaknesses also appeared at the executive level. These 
concerned the administration and operation of organizations responsible 
for promoting agriculture, in which greater progress could have been 
achieved without large additional expenditure. For example, the policy 
regarding large irrigation projects should have been re-examined much 
earlier. Progress would hav~ been more rapid if minor irrigation works 
that were simple to execute, inexpensive, and likely to bring immediate 
results had received maximum encouragement from the start. Another weak 
point has been the launching of new projects before th~ completion of the 
previous ones, which had to be held back often because of lack of money 
and qualified staff. 
1overseas Hindustan Times, March 31, 1960. 
2Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan: Mid-Term Apprai sal, 
Publication Branch, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1964, p. 103. 
CHAPTER V 
POLICY SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Agricultural development can help the overall development of the 
Indian economy in several ways: (a) by increasing the gross national 
product; (b) by supplying the manpower required by other sectors of the 
economy; and (c) by providing the economic surplus which could constitute 
the material basis for industrial development. 
Increases in agricultural production must be such that they learl 
to a surplus and thereby initiate investment at a compounded rate which 
should be well above the rate of increase in population. It is true that 
in the more advanced stages of economic development the bulk of the 
surplus required may come from the industrial sector, but, in India, 
where the economy is predominantly agricultural, a large part of the 
surplus required for economic development will have to come from agri-
culture, at least until the stage is reached whereby industry is able to 
contribute a major portion of the national income. 
In most of the underdeveloped economies, where agricultural tech-
niques are still somewhat primitive, the application of new technology 
often leads to a sustantial and quick increase in agricultural production. 
Once the entire agricultural sector is structured with a new and improved 
technology, the development of agricultural could provide a large surplus 
with relatively little investment and in a comparatively short time. 
Therefore, in the Indian economy, effective agricultural planning which 
focuses on agricultural problems in the context of the broader framework 
that reflects overall development of the nation's total economy is 
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necessary. The problems of increasing farm production in India certainly 
are many and complex. The farmers, their needs and their problems must 
be the focus of all development programs. 
Land reform must also be completed swiftly so that both tenants 
and landowners are free from uncertainity and can concentrate on farm 
improvement and increased yields. Making maximum use of rural manpower 
----to build and maintain irrigation works and to do contour bunding 
and other soil conservation work----is another essential program to 
strengthen the rural economy and thereby assure higher yields. A 
concentrated attack must be made in selected districts in the States 
which, because of irrigation and assured rainfall, have the highest 
potential for increased production. All of the programs will require 
public support and the utmost efficiency in reorganization and admini-
stration along with the necessary investment in the agricultural sector. 
Looking at the problems as a whole, development of agriculture must 
take place on many fronts at once. One of the most urgently needed steps 
is not only to expand irrigation for relieving dependence on the un-
reliable monsoon rains but to stimulate the maximum and most economical 
use of irrigation waters. Another is to expand India's farm extension 
and community development agency, which now reaches slightly more than 
half of the rural population to cover the entire nation and reach all 
farmers with a concentrated educational effort for improving farm practices 
and farm yields. Another essential line of action is to bring within a 
bullock cart's hauling distance of every village the fertilizers, seeds, 
implements and other farm supplies essential for improving crop yields. 
Farm credit must similarly be made readily available to all farmers. 
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There is also a very great need for better knowledge of existing 
farming systems in India as a basis for assessing the types of change 
that are feasible and capable of yielding the greatest returns in specific 
situation. These detailed and specific studies that are needed will not 
be of maximum value unless they are framed with as much understanding as 
possible of the various facts of agricultural development and the inter-
actions between agriculture and non-agriculture in the precess of economic 
growth. This was not done during the planning period, as shown in Chapter 
IV, where it is seen that more importance was given to the industrial 
sector without giving much thought to the agricultural sector. 
A) Pattern of Investment 
The investment pattern in the First Plan was quite appropriate to 
the development needs of the economy because 43.9 per cent of the total 
investment went to the agricultural sector,1 but in the Second Plan it · 
was reduced to 30.32 per cent. Thus, the Planning Commission immediately 
diverted its attention to the heavy industries without looking into the 
future of agriculture. 2 This resulted in a drastic shortage of foodgrains.~ 
Therefore, in considering the pattern of investment~ it is important to 
take the whole economy into account and determine a strategy for develop-
ment accordingly. The pattern of investment in agriculture should not 
be seen in isolation ft·om the investment pattern in general. 
1Because the agricultural secto was extremely bad before planning. 
The agricultural sector includes the community development program, 
irrigation and power. See Table IV:l in Chapter IV. 
2see Tables IV:l and IV:3 in Chapter IV. 
3see Tables I:l in Chapter I and III:3 in Chapter III. 
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As was mentioned in Chapter IV, the investments made in the Second 
and Third Plans were quite unbalanced. That is to say, the Planning 
Commission gave mor~ importance to the industrial sector than the agri-
cultural sector. 1 The reason for this was that at the end of the First 
Plan, the Commission assumed that agriculture was fully developed, and 
therefore, there was no need to give it very much importance. This 
was a mistake on the part of the Planning Commission. Even though there 
were some reasons such as unfavourable monsoons for low agricultural 
production, administrative inefficiencies and very little use being made 
of new technology as a result of the low investment in agriculture were 
the more important reasons. Therefore, to strengthen agriculture, the 
Commission must give weight in terms of investment to the agricultural 
sector in at least one or two future plans. 
Actually, the Fourth Plan was supposed to begin in April, 1966 but 
it began in April 1969. The reason for this delay was the lack of 
financial resources. In the beginning, the Plan was based on an invest-
ment of Rs.240 billion. But, in the first year of the Plan, the Commi-
ssion realized that the resources were not available, so it announced 
that the Fourth Plan would be postponed for three years and would begin 
April, 1969. To avoid repetition of such failures, it is important that 
the total assessed resources needed for public and private development 
programs in agriculture be checked against available funds. At the same 
time, the annual phases of the agricultural program over the plan period 
need to be checked to help to ensure that the total annual expenditures 
1For more detail, see Tables IV:l, IV:3 , IV:6 and IV:8 in Chapter IV. 
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on input and output conform to the available funds, the annual growth of 
demand and the related annual investments in other sectors. When these 
tests have been applied and necessary adjustments made, the pattern of 
investment for the agricultural sector of the national development plan 
would be established more satisfactorily. 
B) Community Development Program 
and the Agricultural Sector 
The community development program began in 1921 at Shantiniketan. 1 
However, it was not until 1951 that the community development program 
began as an allied field of the agricultural sector under planning. The 
total amount spent under the community development program during the 
planning period from 1951-52 to 1965-66 was Rs. 4,904 million, as shown 
in Table V:1. This Table does not show the expenditure for some of the 
important aspects of the community development program. For example, 
provision of financial assistance to farmers is not mentioned at all 
and the amount allocated for farmers• education is very small. Research 
shows that education and the economic status of farmers are the most 
important factors in the community development program, if the goals of 
h . d ? t e ~ommunity development program are to be ach1eve .-
1Dayal, Rajeswar, Community Development Program in India, Kitab 
Mahal Private, Limited, Allahabad-3, India, 1966, pp. 15-19. 
2Rahudkar, W. B., 11 Communication Pattern and the Acceptance of 
agricultural Practices,.. in Selected Readings on Community Development, 
edited by T. P. S. Chaudhari, National Institute of Community Develop-
ment, Hyderabad, 1967, pp. 21-35. And N. Patnaik, Adoption of Agri-
cultural Practices in a Peasant Community in Orissa , National Institute 
of Community Development, .Hyderabad, 1967, pp. 89-100. 
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TABLE V:1 
Expenditure in the Community Development Program 
Under the Three Plan Period 
MaJOr Heads of 
Expenditure 
1 
F1rst 
Plan 
2 
Second lh1rd 
Plan Plan 
3 4 
in millions of Rs. 
Block headquarters and mainteinance 
Agriculture and animal husbandary 
Irrigation and land reclamation 
Village ind~stries 
Health and rural sanitation 
Education 
Social education 
Communication 
Housing 
Unclassified 
Totals 
105.1 
35.5 
108.3 
21.8 
37.9 
34.4 
20.0 
51.6 
17.3 
27.9 
459.8 
547.6 
110.0 
485.9 
70.1 
168.7 
120.6 
101.9 
126.1 
109.0 
31.3 
1,871.2 
Source: India: A Reference Annual, 1969, p. 258. 
809.9 
303.1 
586.7 
135.3 
231.8 
140 .6 
137.9 
184.8 
116.7 
28.4 
2,673 . 2 
Notes: Data for Jammu and Kashmir, and Dadra and Nager Haveli are not 
included here. 
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The community development program is an important step in the · 
development of the rural peasant economy. In the case of Indian econom~ 
which is highly dependent on agriculture and the bulk of the farming 
community lives in the rural areas, the community development program 
can be very effective. As has been mentioned above, in order to make 
the community development program more effective, education is a primary 
necessity because if peopie, especially farmers, are uneducated, then they 
are not able to understand and implement new agricultural techniques. 
The same thing is true for the co-operative movement. In short, commu-
nity development, education and co-operatives must go hand in hand. 
Even though the availability of new tools and implements plays an 
important role in agricultural development, the farmers• competent use 
and utilization of these tools and implements is of paramount importance. 
Needless to say, the competent use and utilization of tools, implements 
and techniques is dependent on the education and training of those involved 
in agriculture. 
Information about new techniques of cultivation, use of fertili-
zers, and new and improved seeds and implements can be provided by the 
agricultural research centres, provided that the field of agricultural 
research is sufficiently developed. This can be done by investing more 
money and, at the same time, taking an active interest in agricultural 
research and education. For example, the governments can educate and 
train the farmers and agricultural students through community develop-
ment programs and co-operatives and thereby encourage them to make use 
of new and improved technology. 
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Under the community development program, the co-operative movement 
should be strengthened to develop the rural peasant economy. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the most useful tool in rural development is 
the co-operative. It can function as an economic system and, at the 
same time, as a cradle for the development of social attributes essential 
to the development of a community, such as organizational skills and co-
operation. The co-operatives can be of immense help in the physical, the 
institutional and the social aspects of agricultural development. 
For example, agricultural credit societies, which are a part of 
co-operatives, play an important role in agricultural development by 
providing financial assistance to the millions of poor farmers. In Helm•s 
words: 
11Agricultural credit is an important apprach to development and 
progress in the agrarian sector of the economy. Much of its 
success, however, will depend on the ways in which the farmer 
can gain access to credit facilities and the degree of supervision 
of his utilization of the credit. 11 1 
Even though there are agricultural credit societies, these societies 
are not enough and they do not have enough funds to provide sufficient 
financial assistance to the farmers. 2 
Without the financial assistance, the farmer would not be able to 
obtain the tools and implements he needs. The experience of Japan shows 
that: 
1Helm, F. C., The Economics of Co-operative Enterprises, The Co-
operative College, Tanzania, In association with the University of 
London Press Ltd., 1958, p. 71. 
I. 
2For more detail, see Section-C, .. Agricultural Credit, .. in Chapter 
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"Appropriate expenditure by the government (on agricultural research, 
extension, credit and roads) can have spectacular effects on the 
output of peasants, and that agriculture •..•. (instead of) acting 
as a brake on the rest of the economy can be turned into a leader, 
generating demand for ether sectors, and also providing them with 
capital. But most governments in the same or similar situations 
have neglected agriculture, with the r~sult that its f~ilure to 
expand has kept down the rate of growth in other sectors. 11 1 
C) Land Reform and Co-operative Farming 
As was mentioned earlier in Chapter II, ~he microfarm is one of the 
impediments to technological change and mechanization in Indian agri-
culture. This is to say that it is difficult to employ large machines 
and take advantages of return to scale on very small farms. 2 The problem 
posed by microfarms can be solved by co-operative farming and land reform. 
By combining small farms, owned by different farmers, it would be possible 
to bring about large farms where new technology could be utilized. 
In addition to the possibility of utilizing better technology, co-
operative farming could provide better capital formation for irrigation, 
better credit facilities, better tools and better machinery. At the same 
time, it would prevent the fragmentation and sub-division of land. How-
ever, it is important to note that the success of co-operative farming 
depends on the education and training of the peasants in respect to the 
nature of co-operative duties and responsibilities. 
An alternative to co-operatives, because of the weaknesses inherent 
in them, is the provision of new technology and services for farmers 
1Lewis, W. A., Theory of Economic Growth, George Allen and Unwin 
Co., London, 1955, p. 279. 
2see Section-0, "Factors Inhibiting Technological Change and 
Mechanization in Indian Agriculture, .. in Chapter II. 
i 
! 
i 
! . 
100 
through government agencies. For example, the government could establish 
small units at the village level to provide new machines and services. 
For each village or for two or three villages together (depending on 
the size of the villages), the government could establish a centre 
which would provide technological facilities to the farmers. This type 
of program may be a very useful and effective instrument in changing 
the face of the rural peasant economy. 
D) Improved Marketing, Transportation and 
Communication,and Storage Facilities 
At the commencement of the Third Plan, Colin Clark pointed out that: 
11The extreme pre-occupation with capital investment has led to the 
neglect of the other factors in growth and economic development: 
improvement in education, the development of the legal and insti-
tutional framework required for a market economy-----a dependable 
currency, a banking and credit system ..... heavy investment in 
transportation and communication. These defects blatantly dis-
figure India's Second Plan (1956~61)."1 
Marketing 
Marketing facilities are very poor in rural India. A number of 
problems arise when a farmer is about to sell his produce. For example, 
he cannot get good prices because of middlemen. He has to pay several 
types of fees in the selling procedure, such as agent's commission and 
market fees. Sometimes, in the village market, the farmer has to rely 
on an auctioning process where his produce is auctioned off at the best 
obtainable price. Usually farmers cannot get good prices because buyers 
know that the farmers do not have sufficient storage facilities or the 
ability to wait, and therefore, they will sell their produce for whatever 
prices they can get. 
1clark, Colin, Growthmanship, Longan, 1961, p. 28. 
1 
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Efficient marketing plays an important role in making the best use 
of what is produced. The marketing system, by removing. maladjustments 
----regional, seasonal, quantitative, and qualitative----the concomitants 
of specialization and localization of production, renders invaluable 
service to the productive process. The remunerativeness for the agr·i-
cultural sector also depends on the efficiency of the marketing system. 
Marketing and productive efficiency, thus, go together. 
Transportation and Communication 
An examination of the three Plans (from 1951-52 to 1965-66) would 
indicate, transportation and commun1cation were neglected, especially 
in the Third Plan. For example, in the First Plan, 26.3 per cent of the 
total outlay was allocated to transportation and communication. In the 
Second Plan, the corresponding figure was 28.3 per cent, while in the 
Third Plan, it was reduced to 16.7 per cent.1 Therefore, transportation 
and communication remained backward. 
To support this argument, R. K. Mukerjee points out that: 
11 Communication from the field to the village and from the village 
to the MANDl are often extremely poor and defective. Bad roads, 
lanes, and tracks connecting the villages with the markets not 
only add to the cost of transportation, but also lead to multi-
plication of small dealers and intermediaries. They also restrict 
markets by hindering cheap and rapid movement of agricultural 
produce ... 2 
Therefore, transportation and communication facilities must be improved. 
1see Tables IV:l, IV:3 and IV:6 in Chapter IV. 
2Mukerjee, R. K., Economic Problems of Modern India, International 
Publication Service, New York, 1968, p. 295. MANDl referes to market, 
the place where farmers sell their produce. 
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Better communication facilities which would permit broadcasting of 
day-to-day agricultural prices in regional languages, diffusion of new 
technology and demonstrating new agricultural techniques through films, 
could be a very good apprach to developing the Indian agricultural sector. 
This could be done by establishing a special department which would have 
branch offices •in every district. Each district office would be given 
the responsibility of providing this information to the farmers through 
the small Field Units which would demonstrate how to use new technology. 
The other information, including day-to-day prices and diffusion of new 
agricultural techniques and technology, would be provided through radio 
stations in the regional languages. It would also be necessary to have 
a government building with radio and movie facilities in every village 
to provide various information to the farmers. 
Storage Facilities 
The lack of adequate storage facilities is also one of the problems 
which make marketing difficult. The government of India had a total 
storage capacity of 2.313 million tons at the end of 1968, of which 
1.564 million tons capacity had been transferred to the Food Corporation 
of India by December, 1968. Another 1,500 tons capacity has been trans-
ferred to the Assam State Warehousing Corporation. The remaining 
capacity available to the government is only 748,000 tons. 1 This shows 
that the storage facilities are not sufficient for increasing food 
production. 
1Govt. of India, India: A Reference Annual, Publication Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 
1969, p. 233. 
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The storage facilities required for agricultural products are of two 
types: (a) temporary, which are needed before the produce is moved to 
the market place; and (b) long term, which are needed for uniform distri-
bution of supply according to demand. The damages arising from rain, 
exposure to dampness and insects lead to great losses and, consequently, 
must also be considered. 
Even if the farmer wants to store his produce in his own house for 
a short period, he cannot do so because the housing conditions of small 
farmers are such that they do not provide adequate protection against 
rain, flood and fire. 
E) Irrigation Facility 
In most parts of India, the moisture in the land is a limiting 
factor in raising agricultural productivity. One of the major charac-
teristics of the climat~ in India is that nine t~nths of the annual rain-
fall occurs during the four months of the year from June to September. 
As was mentioned in Chapter II, the irrigation facilities in India are 
inadequate. 1 Only 19 per cent of the total cultivatable land is irri-
gated. 2 
However, the problem is complicated by the uncertainty ~of the mon-
soon seasons. Not only does rainfall vary from region to region, but 
yearly variations also are common, to such an extent that sometimes the 
rainfall is so heavy that the fertile part of the land is washed away, 
1see Section-0, "Factors Inhibiting Technological Change and 
Mechanization in Indian Agriculture, 11 in Chapter I I. 
2India: A Reference Annual, Op. Cit., 1969, p. 225. 
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while at other times it is insufficient even for meagre agricultural 
purposes. 
Many people look at irrigation as a means of protecting crops from 
drought. This view is true in traditional farming, but the full poten-
tiality of irrigation has to be grasped under a changing technology, 
especially the increasing use of fertilizers and machines~ In this 
context, irrigation is important for the entire country. 
The government should use the full water potential available in the 
country through a canal system. In some parts of India canal irrigation 
is not available because this type of irrigation depends on the availa-
bility of lake or river water and the level of the land. In such cases, 
lift irrigation would be very useful. Lift irrigation, with tube-wells 
or ordinary wells, has some superiority over canal irrigation. For 
example, with lift irrigation, water is available throughout the year 
and there is very little, or no, possibility of over-watering, as is 
quite often true in the case of canal irrigation. 
However, in India, proper agricultural planning is necessary in order 
to have successful irri~ation techniques. The basic features of such 
planning could be suggested as follows: 
1) Proper co-ordination between irrigation and agricultural 
development on a regional basis, backed by adequate research 
programs. Advanced programing of irrigation needs should not 
be based on the traditional farming system but should be based on 
the requirements of modern farming. 
2)A .revision of irrigation rat es on a scientific basis. Proper 
investigation should be carried out to calculate the marginal 
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productivity of irrigation unde~ different cropping systems and 
for different areas. 
3) In determining the irrigation system to be used, such as canal or 
tube-wells, due consideration should be given to the topography 
of the region, the types of soil, the lag between investment and 
actual results, the size of investment and the possibilities of 
economizing capital by using labour. 
4) As was mentioned earlier, an extension program should be estab-
lished to educate and train the farmers and to provide necessary 
guidance, in relation to available water supply, cultivation 
practices, intensity of cultivation and application of fertili-
zers, in order to make the best use of irrigation facilities and 
new technology. 
5) In many areas where canals cannot effectively meet the irrigation 
needs, a supplementary program of lift-irrigation must be provided. 
F) Agricultural Price Policy and Administration 
Price instability is one of the major reasons for changes in the 
content of agricultural production and, thereby, fluctuations in foodgrain 
production. This, in turn, causes fluctuations in the incomes of the food-
grain-producing farmers. 
Tables V:2 and V:3 show the annual average percentage rate of change 
in the price of foodgrains and cash crops. These price changes apply 
not only to the harvest price but also to the general price. Again, Table 
V:3 shows that price fluctuations have occurred every year from 1947-48 . 
to 1959-60. This was due to poor agricultural administration. 
\ 
I " 
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TABLE V:2 
Average Annual Rate of Change in Price of Foodgrains 
Crops 1947-48 1950-51 1954-55 1947-48 
to to to to 
1950-51 1954-55 1959-60 1959-60 
1 2 3 4 5 
~er cent 
Rice +10.3 -6.0 +5.3 +0.4 
Jowar +2.9 -8.9 +13.7 +0.5 
Bajra +1.0 -6.5 +12.8 +0. 7 
Mize +9.3 -10.2 +10.1 -0.9 
Ragi +1.7 -2.9 +12.4 +2.0 
Weat -1.6 -2.9 -8.1 +6.3 
Barley +4.7 -11.4 +16.8 +0 . 2 
Total Cereals: +5.9 -7.4 +8.9 +4.0 
Gram +9.6 -14.0 +16.0 +0.9 
Tur or Arthar +20.7 -12.6 +5.6 +2.8 
Other Pulses +5.5 10.4 +7.2 -2.6 
Total Pulses: +10.0 -12.6 +19.3 +1.0 
Total of Cereals 
and Pulses: +6.7 -8.4 +9.7 +0.03 
Source: John, P. V., Q£. Cit., p. 200. 
- : 
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TABLE V:3 
Average Annual Rate of Change in Price of Cash Crops 
Crops 1947-48 1950-51 1954-55 1947-48< 
to to to to 
1950-51 1954-55 1959-60 1959-60 
1 2 3 4 5 
~er cent 
Groundnut +2.0 +11.4 +8.2 +2.3 
Castor Seed +6.6 -16.6 +27.1 -0.7 
Sesamum +7.8 -10.7 +10.0 +0.8 
Rape & Mustard +11.3 -11.4 +12.3 -1.3 
Lin Seed +25.6 -13.7 +15.2 +0.06 
Raw Sugar +11.4 -10.2 +7.6 -2.7 
Potatoes -3.3 -0.8 -3.7 -1.8 
Tobacco -7.4 -3.6 -2.3 -3.5 
Black Pepper -0.4 -17.0 -7.7 -16.8 
Chili +4.9 +0.8 +4.8 +5.4 
Tea +0.8 +11.6 -1.3 +4.9 
1 Coffee -8.1 -2.1 +21.1 +4.3 
! 
Rubber +13.4 -5.5 +11.6 +14.9 
Cotton -0.8 +11.7 +8.1 +3.2 
Jute +19.2 -10.4 +20.0 -0.8 
All Cash Crops +7.6 -8.2 -2.3 -4.7 
Source: John, P. V., Q£.. Cit., p. 206. 
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The interesting thing about the price changes is that, in many parts 
of the country, prices fluctuate within the region and also within the 
same foodgrain and agricultural product. For example, as B. R. Shenoy 
points out in his evaluation of the three Five Year Plans: 
.. Wheat was distributed through fair-price shops at Rs.8.50 per 20 
kg. in Ahmedabad though its free market price ranged much higher, 
from Rs.21.65 to Rs.26.25 per 20 kg. depending upon the quality. 
Simultaneously, the price of cattle feed for 20 kg. was Rs.13.50 
for Chuni, Rs.10.60 for Cotton-seed and Rs.8.65 for Guar. It was, 
therefore, worthwhile to tap the supplies of wheat from fair-price 
shops for mixing with cattle feed, through collusion with the 
operators of these shops, through ghost cards or other devices. 111 
He again points out that: 
11Until recently, the price of wheat2 distributed through fair-price 
shops in Ahmedabad and elsewhere in Gujarat was Rs.42.50 per quintal, 
each family being given 15 kg . per week, or 15 ozs. per head, per 
day. The free-market prices of wheat ranged much higher, from 
Rs.68.25 to Rs.131.25 per quintal, depending upon quality. The fair-
price shops also sell rice at Rs.75 per quintal, the quantities sold 
per family being 2 kg. per week, or 2 ozs. per head, per day. Rice 
is not distributed through fair-price shops and its black market 
price is of the order of Rs.120. per quintal, as against the control-
led w~olesale price of Rs.96. 11 3 
Thus, there are two types of market prices prevailing for agricultural 
products, especially for foodgrains, in rural India: (a) the off icial 
market price; and (b) the free-market price or the black market price. 
These prices have produced an economic chaos which consequently affects 
agricultural production. 
1 Shenoy, B. R., 2£. Cit., p. 99. 
2The weat, distributed through the fair-price shops, was U.S. wheat 
imported under PL 480; the landed cost of this wheat was much lower than 
the prices charged at fair-price shops. 
3shenoy, B. R., QB_. Cit., p. 101. 
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The above analysis reveals that there is a very great need for a 
better price policy in Indian agriculture in order to increase agricul-
tural production. It also reveals that there are limitations to the 
working of the price mechanism in India as far as foodgrain production 
is concerned. The objectives of a price policy, with regard to foodgrains, 
have often been described as the maintenance of price levels fair to the 
producer as well as to the consumer and the avoidance of undue fluctu-
ations over time. 
Keeping all of the above aspects of price fluctuation and agri-
cultural production in mind, it seems that the broad objectives of a 
price policy for increased foodgrain production should be: 
1) maintenance of general price stability in the face of an increas~ 
ing public outlay to bring about economic development. 
2) maintenance of parity between foodgrain and non-foodgrain 
prices and between agricultural and non-agricultural prices i n 
the interests of the vital agricultural output programs. 
Attempt may be made to stabilize prices through buffer stocks, open 
market operations and the guarantee of flows in order to protect the 
farmer from seasonal fluctuations . These fluctuations may be overcome 
by guaranteed prices or guaranteed incomes. The necessarN incentives for 
larger production have to be preserved. It is suggested, therefore, that 
the government should set up and promote the necessary co-operatives and 
state agencies for the purchase and sale of foodgrains at appropriate 
stages so as to stregnthen its power to influence prices and to prevent 
anti-social activities, such as hoarding and profiteering, from getting 
the upper hand. 
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In view of the large programs of agricultural development, the need 
for better agricultural administration is very important. Poor adminis-
tration in the agricultural sector of India creates a number of problems 
which hinder agricultural production. For example, as was mentioned 
earlier, the main reason for the low amount of fertilizer application in 
Indian agriculture is the non-availability of adequate supplies at the 
right time. 1 In other words, due to poor administration, the farmers 
cannot get enough supplies of fertilizers when they are really needed. 
In the case of agricultural prices, the situation is even worse. 
As is stated in the previous section, the prices of foodgrains and other 
agricultural products vary tremendously, no matter how the government 
tries to control them. It has been shown that even under a system of 
controlled prices and fair-price shops people can buy and sell at the 
black market price, which is always higher than the controlled or fair 
prices. This is because of poor administration by corrupt government 
officials, as Professor B. R. Shenoy pointed out in his book in which he 
analyzed the three Five Year Plans. 2 
Thus, agricultural administration needs to be improved. To do this, 
a series of proposals were made before the beginning of the Third Plan 
by the Agricultural Administration Committee. These were not adequately 
implemented, as was previously stated. Therefore, the strengthening of 
staff at various levels, such as an anti-corruption department, the re-
vision of terms and conditions of employment, and the expansion of 
1see Section-0, 11 Factors Inhibiting Technological Change and 
Mechanization in Indian Agriculture," in Chapter II. 
2shenoy, B. R., ~·Cit., pp. 283-286. 
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facilities for training, education and research should be matters of 
first priority. 
G) Conclusion 
As the foregoing study has indicated, the First Five Year Plan took 
the development of agriculture as a pre-condition for viable industrial 
development. However, the Second and Third Plans (from 1956-57 to 
1965-66) shifted the emphasis strongly toward industrial development, 
especially the development of heavy industries. The relative emphasis 
on agricultural development was significantly reduced. 
This decline of investment in agriculture led to food shortages in 
the country. In terms of what was needed to provide·: a big push, the 
Second Plan was relatively limited. Although in the Third Plan the 
financial resources were relatively greater than in the Second Plan, 
they were not properly allocated so as to meet the requirements of agri-
culture. Thus, the lack of resources and, at the same time, inadequate 
investment for agriculture were major causes of the failure of the Second 
and Third Plans. 
To solve these problems, first, a proper balance between the growth 
of manufacturing and ~f agriculture is essential for the development of 
the Indian economy as a whole. Second, India, as an underdeveloped 
country, should strive to increase her agricultural output, since the 
more she can do so, the less she needs to rely on the import of agri-
cultural products including foodgrains. 
Moreover, there is every reason to believe that India can earn very 
high returns on investments through the discover~~ propggation, and financ-
ing of · land reclamation and in developing agricultural methods through 
\ 
l 
I 
I 
I -
112 
agricultural research and extension services such as the community 
development program and co-operatives. Thus, the agricultural sector 
in India can make a major contribution to the overall economic develop-
ment. It seems that, if India is to achieve her economic aspirations, 
she will be well advised to develop the agricultural sector first and, 
then turn gradually toward industrialization. 
It is likely that India will be faced with a lagging agriculture 
unless she introduces new and improved technology extensively. Even 
though this would create further social adaptation problems, as discussed 
in Chapter II, it is essential for increasing foodgrain production and, 
when acco~panied by an improvement in administration, would lead to 
continuous high agricultural productivity. The achievement of this would 
require : first, the reduction of the abundant public sector appropriations 
to free investment funds for the agricultural sector and, second, the 
suitable amendment of the legislation which is crippling the business of 
agricultural credit by obstructing the flow of credit and capital into 
farm finance . and impa~ring the credit-worthiness of farmers. 
In addition to the adoption of new technology and the improvement 
in administration, there is also a need for close collaboration among 
agricultural scientists in order to identify and seek solutions to newly 
emerging agricultural development problems. 
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